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Abstract This article notes the convergence of recent thinking in neuroscience and
grounded cognition regarding the way we understand mental representation and recol-
lection: ideas are dynamic and multi-modal, actively created at the point of recall. Also,
neurophysiologically, re-entrant signalling among cortical circuits allows non-conscious
processing to support our deliberative thoughts and actions. The qualitative research we
describe examines the exchanges occurring during semi-structured interviews with 360
children age 3–13, including 294 from New Zealand (158 boys, 136 girls) and 66 from
China (34 boys, 32 girls) concerning their understanding of the shape and motion of the
Earth, Sun and Moon (ESM). We look closely at the relationships between what is revealed
as children manipulate their own play-dough models and their apparent understandings of
ESM concepts. In particular, we focus on the switching taking place between what is said,
what is drawn and what is modelled. The evidence is supportive of Edelman’s view that
memory is non-representational and that concepts are the outcome of perceptual mappings,
a view which is also in accord with Barsalou’s notion that concepts are simulators or skills
which operate consistently across several modalities. Quantitative data indicate that the
dynamic structure of memory/concept creation is similar in both genders and common to
the cultures/ethnicities compared (New Zealand European and Ma¯ori; Chinese Han) and
that repeated interviews in this longitudinal research lead to more advanced modelling
skills and/or more advanced shape and motion concepts, the results supporting hypotheses
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov alpha levels .05; rs: p\ .001).
Keywords Memory  Mental models  Conceptual coherence  Framework theory 
Modal skills and simulations  Re-entrant signalling
You cannot depend on your eyes when your imagination is out of focus.
Mark Twain (1989)
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1 Introduction
Young people’s understandings of the visible cosmos (the Sun, the Moon, planet Earth and
the stars) have been the subject of research for many decades, and much is known about the
acquisition—the relatively slow acquisition—of accurate, scientific ideas. Following in the
Piagetian tradition (see Piaget 1929, 1930), the major focus for researchers has been on
what young people say in response to questions, on their verbal explanations during semi-
structured interviews for events such as daytime and night-time, sunrise and sunset, the
seasons, lunar phases, and eclipses. Secondly, but to a lesser extent, influenced by the
pioneering work of Nussbaum and Novak (1976), Nussbaum (1979) and the later work of
Klein (1982), Sneider and Pulos (1983) and Vosniadou and Brewer (1992, 1994), chil-
dren’s drawings of the Earth, Sun and Moon (ESM) have provided an alternative medium
of interpretation of children’s cosmological concepts. Thirdly, models—created by chil-
dren from either clay (see Brewer et al. 1987) or play-dough (see Bryce and Blown 2006),
or the use of cultural artefacts like plastic or styrofoam models of globes by teachers or
researchers (see Schoultz et al. 2001; Vosniadou et al. 2005)—have also been interpreted
for insights into what they reveal, often in complementary but not always consistent ways.
Interviews with young people endeavour to tap into their previous learning, of course,
and conversational exchanges pivot on what subjects can recollect or bring to mind at that
point. It is readily apparent that, where circumstances permit—in research, in everyday
teaching and in ordinary conversations—people sometimes naturally shift from verbal
exchange to sketching their thoughts or, more rarely (particularly in the case of 3D objects
and concepts), devising a model to show what they mean or perhaps signalling an indi-
cation with their hands and arms. (Classical examples in the history of science with regard
to models include the Rutherford–Bohr model of the atom and the Watson–Crick model of
DNA.) Relatively few researchers have explored the differences stemming from these
modalities and the variations in apparent knowledge when subjects change from expla-
nation to drawing to modelling. The research described here looked closely at these
variations and the ways in which subjects revealed comprehension when they changed
modes in the course of a semi-structured interview. That is, we focused on the switching
taking place between what was said, what was drawn and what was modelled.
Important, however, is the underpinning theorising involved in all of these considera-
tions. In the aforementioned literature on children’s cosmologies, educational researchers
and developmental psychologists have conventionally reasoned, though not always
explicitly in the case of ESM investigations, that the recollections from memory which
children are deploying as they answer questions and problem-solve are in the form ofmental
models. That is, in common with mainstream cognitive psychologists, it is usually presumed
that subjects use some kind of internal representation of the world, as they consider things
(see Gentner and Stevens 1983; Johnson-Laird 1983), whether these representations are
silent verbalisations or images of some kind (in 2 or 3 dimensions). In our own previous
investigations exploring age effects, gender and cultural differences in conceptual devel-
opment (Bryce and Blown 2006), we implicitly assumed children’s cosmological ideas to
reflect the use of mental models. These had much in common with Nussbaum and Novak’s
(1976) Earth notions and appeared to be based on a representative form of memory.
Although they recognised that their Earth notions were ‘‘not the only ones prevalent in the
wide population of children’’ (p. 542) and Vosniadou (1992) described mental models as
‘‘synthetic and dynamic structures’’ (p. 348), both Earth notions and mental models have
tended to be interpreted as static forms used to categorise children’s concepts. Such a view
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has been reinforced by diagrams of the various models being commonly used as illustrations
of same. Nevertheless, research has shown that variations in methodology and interview
technique can influence the range of mental models elicited (see Fre`de et al. 2011; Nobes
et al. 2003; Panagiotaki et al. 2006; Schoultz et al. 2001). This suggests that children’s
cosmologies are richer than the categorisation systems used to classify them.
Most importantly, recent experimentation and theoretical deliberations in other bran-
ches of science provide a quite different alternative and, in order to contextualise the
present research, we need to appreciate what neurophysiologists and neuropsychologists
now say about the multi-modality of recollection: mental representation is now understood
very differently from what pioneering cognitive scientists envisaged. Our rationale for the
research and the analysis described in this article was framed by these new considerations.
Before we examine them, it is pertinent to comment on the terms mental models and
modelling more generally.
2 Mental Models and Modelling in the Science Education Literature
A review of relevant literature reveals that educational researchers have, for some time,
explored students’ construction and use of models as part of their instruction in science,
often relating issues to the role of models and thought experiments in the discipline itself.
With the Nature of Science (NoS) figuring in recent science curricula, some researchers
have explored the relationships between what students experience in the classroom and
laboratory, how well they grasp related scientific content as specified in school curricula,
and how scientists construe their own speciality—see, for example, Matthews’ (2007)
introductory chapter in the special issue of Science & Education 16(7) and the articles
therein. Adu´riz-Bravo’s (2013) philosophical analysis makes the case for a ‘‘semantic’’
view of scientific models for science education to be pursued. Thought experiments, both
in the conduct of science and productively in relation to its teaching, have been considered
in recent articles by Reiner and Burko (2003), Galili (2009), Blown and Bryce (2012) and
Ko¨sem and O¨zdemir (2014). In the article by Justi and Gilbert (2002) and the text by
Gilbert and Boulter (2012), both models and modelling are discussed extensively.
The scientific activity of modelling seeks to make real-world phenomena easier to deal
with, essentially by simplifying matters and allowing exploration and testing to be carried
out on factors of interest and relevance. Proponents of ‘‘model-based’’ learning in edu-
cation consider that students can gain insights into the scientific ideas involved through
some form of activity. Where this is used in an iterative fashion, the teacher’s role becomes
more akin to that of a facilitator, managing how the students go about weighing up ideas,
laboratory results and previous learning. Grandy (2003) considers whether ‘‘model-based’’
is akin to ‘‘theorising’’ and looks at the relationship between implicit mental models and
explicit external models. He argues that more attention should be paid to the mathematical
nature of many models in science. Halloun (2006) takes the argument further, contending
that education in science should be more aligned with how scientists use modelling in their
work and therefore that pedagogy in science education necessarily should be concerned
with model-based learning. He reasons that teacher mediation of appropriate kinds can
improve student learning, reduce attrition rates and narrow gaps in achievement between
students from different backgrounds.
Examples of research looking at students’ mental models drawing on the historical
perspective include the report by Spiliotopoulou-Papantoniou (2006) on pupils’ drawings
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of ‘‘how they imagine the universe to be’’, comparing them with past and present scientific
conceptions. While she found no overall analogical evolution of the ideas between these
two fields, some children’s models resembled historical cases. A second example is the
study by Feigenberg et al. (2002) which dealt with the problem of relating the distance and
scale of the cosmic bodies in the solar system, comparing historic as well as contemporary
views of scientists with children’s intuitive understandings and their grasp of the relative
dimensions involved. The authors argue that pupil activities be broadened to include
laboratory work based on historical experiments. Thirdly, Thijs and Van Den Berg’s
(1995) report examined children’s alternative frameworks cross-culturally, finding some of
them to be universal and others to be culture specific. The researchers conclude that the
effectiveness of ways of remediating alternative conceptions is strongly influenced by
cultural aspects of the teaching–learning process. Fourthly, with regard to motion and
mechanics (considered by many writers to be fundamental to basic science), Ebison (1993)
argues that the features of Aristotelian physics (eventually reformulated by Galileo and
Newton) were rooted in common sense, thus explaining why young persons’ under-
standings are so resistant to change. Fifthly, and again from a historical perspective,
Lauginie (2013) examines how scientists eventually understood that light had a velocity
and argues that key points in that history ought to be brought into science discussions.
Sixthly, and concerned explicitly with the pre-service preparation of primary teachers to
teach science, de Hosson and De´camp (2014) describe the use of ancient Chinese and
Greek astronomical data as part of a training sequence in elementary astronomy. The
researchers relate their justification for the success of their materials to the central argu-
ments involved in teaching the Nature of Science.
3 Neuroscience and Recent Ideas in Cognition
Recent advances in neuroscience have revealed the complex morphology of the human
brain, in particular the immense richness and intricacy of its neural interconnections and
what these achieve. The new developments have transformed what is understood to be
happening during what we think of as recognition or recall, moving away from the con-
ventional notion of the extraction of items from a fixed storage or database to the idea of
memory as skill rather than content. This radical view considers memory to be a dynamical
system whereby recall consists of the skill or ability to create and recreate concepts by way
of imagery and simulations, and to translate these into representations by way of language,
drawings, models and other modalities. Edelman (2005, 2006) has emphasised the huge
redundant capacity involved in neurons and neural networks and how the networks
function to create working memory and recollection (and indeed consciousness itself). He
argues, with support from modern scanning technologies and investigations using non-
invasive magneto-encephalography, that groups of neurons undergo selection during
human maturation, learning and recall. These changes continue to be developed and
modified as we interact with the environment. In emphasising the plasticity of the brain
throughout an individual’s life, Edelman states:
Not only is the fine structure of each brain unique, but the principles of Neural Darwinism [selection
at the synaptic level] lead directly to the notion of degeneracy: different brain structures can carry out
the same function or lead to the same output (Edelman 2006, p. 57).
The neural group selection that Edelman describes means that the resulting mental
processing is anything but a reflection of repeated ‘‘programming’’. Crucially, what is
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called re-entrant signalling1 occurs so that there is an ongoing interchange of signals
taking place in parallel between brain maps, these continuously relating one to another in
time and space. ‘‘[T]he overall result is that reentry allows the integration, at many levels,
of functionally segregated maps’’ (Edelman and Tononi 1996, p. 186, emphasis added). Or,
in Edelman’s more recent text, what happens is ‘‘the widespread synchronisation of the
activity of widely distributed neuronal groups’’ (Edelman 2005, p. 41). This means that
there is a steady interplay between numerous networks mediating the processes which
result in what are traditionally understood as mental representation, imaging, conceptu-
alisation, skilled manipulation and so forth—and the interplay is highly adaptive. For
example, to quote Edelman again:
The mapped connections from the sense of touch in the hand through the thalamus to the region of
somatosensory cortex are variable and plastic, even in adults. The subregions in the somatosensory
cortex mapping the fingers dynamically shift all their boundaries as a result of excessive use of even
one finger—a shift in the context of use (Edelman 2005, p. 36).
These ideas from neuroscience interestingly connect with the thinking of those cogni-
tive theorists who have questioned the idea of concepts as representations and posit them
not as models of reality such as mental models but rather as simulators or skills in creating
such images consistently over a range of modal stimuli and responses (see Barsalou 2003).
Van Gelder (1998) has even gone as far as to dispense with the idea of representation
entirely in his consideration of the relationships between skill and knowledge. We have not
resorted to this in our own previous work on the coherence of conceptions (see, for
example, Blown and Bryce (2010) where we have assessed young people’s understandings
via different modalities—talking, drawing and play-dough modelling), but we have cer-
tainly demonstrated conceptual coherence in children’s thinking compatible with both a
representational connotation and a cognitive skill interpretation of concepts. We found no
evidence in support of the counter-theory of knowledge-in-pieces proposed by diSessa
(1988, 2008) and advocated by Nobes et al. (2003). The original arguments by Murphy and
Medin (1985, pp. 289–290) that peoples’ theories of the world embody conceptual
knowledge have been reiterated in modern terms by Vosniadou et al. (2008, p. 4): ‘‘At the
heart of our theoretical approach is the idea that initial explanations of the physical world
in naı¨ve physics are not fragmented observations but form a coherent whole, a framework
theory’’.2 Thus, we have used the expression knowledge-skill compounding in the devel-
opment of children’s thought processes ‘‘whereby improved conceptual skill may be
effected by a complex interaction of socio-cultural factors including cultural awareness,
priority given to science in society, and emphasis on astronomy in the science curriculum’’
(Blown and Bryce 2010, p. 37).
Edelman is firmly dismissive of the common usages of representation and is at pains to
say that brain morphology does not permit any equation between ‘‘meaning’’ and ‘‘mental
representation’’ in the ways in which both of these terms are normally used. To quote him
again:
There are no functional states that can be uniquely equated with defined or coded computational
states in individual brains and no processes that can be equated with the execution of algorithms.
Instead, there is an enormously rich set of selectional repertoires of neuronal groups whose
1 Some writers, like Rose, consider the term re-entry to be confusing and refer to the multiple and re-
ciprocal interconnections among the module circuitry in the brain (see Rose 2006, 2007). Confusingly,
different writers use several spellings (re-entry, re-entrant, reentry, reentrant) all meaning the same thing.
2 An update on this has been recently published by Vosniadou and Skopeliti (2014) and will be discussed in
the concluding sections of the present article.
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degenerate responses can, by selection, accommodate the open-ended richness of environmental
input, individual history, and individual variation (Edelman 2005, p. 111).
The point here is that the neuroscience and the research on grounded cognition
(whereby ‘‘modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition’’
according to Barsalou 2008, p. 617) resolve any question about the primacy of any one
mode of thinking, or of its dependent relationship upon another. Barsalou points to how
neuroimaging research has confirmed the central role that simulation3 plays in conceptual
processing. Citing Martin (2001, 2007), he states:
When conceptual knowledge about objects is represented, brain areas that represent their properties
during perception and action become active. In particular, brain areas that represent the shape and
color of objects (fusiform gyrus), the motion they exhibit (middle and superior temporal lobe), and
the actions that agents perform on them (premotor and parietal areas) become active to represent
these properties conceptually (Barsalou 2008, p. 627).
We should recognise that neuroscientists now urge us to view thinking as involving
mutually supportive, self-correcting and simultaneously adjusting processes instigated by
different modalities—all the time, naturally. The child who is explaining in words his/her
understanding of the movement of the Earth around the Sun, then switches to his/her own
drawing of these bodies to show what he/she means, or upon the request of an interviewer,
models them with play-dough to represent them three-dimensionally, does so because his/
her brain’s wiring enables such capabilities—either simultaneously or near simultaneously
in time. And, by switching modes, whether naturally at his/her own instigation, or through
directed questioning (Socratic dialogue), the child modifies his/her ideas (or at least
endeavours to do so, often to clarify meaning).
To take a particular finding from our research on children’s cosmologies, it is interesting
that there is a strong correlation between children’s ability to model Earth–Sun–Moon
configurations as spherical bodies, and the ability to model the rotation and revolution of
these bodies; i.e. modelling motion scientifically appears to be strongly related to mod-
elling shape scientifically (if a child models the Earth, Sun and Moon as spheres, they are
more likely to be able to model rotation and revolution scientifically). Similarly, there are
strong correlations between children’s verbal descriptions of cosmological concepts such
as Earth Shape and Earth Motion, and children’s drawings of Earth Shape and Earth
Motion (see Results). There may be several factors at work here, such as how these ideas
figure during instruction or in presentations which children come across in books and
television, but one possibility relates to the now-demonstrated multi-modality of the sen-
sory-motor system—see Gallese and Lakoff (2005) whose work we will return to in the
final section. Modelling motion scientifically and modelling shape scientifically may be
pertinent reflections of that multi-modality. Our first consideration was that the coherence
among the shape and motion concepts from three media of expression might indicate that
there is a deeper underlying structure [possibly founded on roundness, circularity and
sphericity (see Fig. 1 in due course), and possibly in turn based on an unconscious non-
3 Cognitive theorists use the term simulation to mean the mental re-enactment of perceptual, motor and
introspective states acquired during our previous experiences with the world, the actions of our own bodies,
and our minds. According to Barsalou (2003): ‘‘A concept is not a single abstracted representation for a
category, but is instead a skill for constructing idiosyncratic representations tailored to the current needs of
situated action… a concept is a simulator that constructs an infinite set of specific simulations…’’ (p. 521).
Thus, from a global dynamic perspective a concept is both a skill and a simulator, and one can imagine it as
a skill in creating simulations. However, from a domain-specific perspective, representation of concepts
requires cognitive skill to imagine, create and regenerate the concepts (such as Earth’s shape or motion), and
dexterous and motor skills to form the shape of the concept and model its rotation and revolution.
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representative substrate as suggested by Edelman 2005, p. 104, see below] from which
specific concepts of shape and motion draw static and kinetic images. But, regardless of
whether or not this is the case, the coherence does support the notion that children’s ideas
are both dynamic and multi-modal.
That is, to generalise, such correlations detected in developmental research are con-
sistent with the consequences of the functional properties of the re-entrant structures
revealed by neuroscience research. We think multi-modally, adjusting our reasoning as we
go along, exploiting metaphors and borrowed images as best we can. A picture that we
draw, or a model that we make, neither precedes nor follows an explanation that we give in
attempting to indicate what we mean; each modality we deploy reveals some of our
meaning, and in turn our efforts may adjust our thinking—though the different ways in
which we do so may be more or less helpful to those who attend to us.
The switching of ideas which takes place as we reason or problem-solve necessarily
involves shifts between ideas which we are consciously addressing and ideas which,
moments before, we were not aware of, but somehow ‘‘come to mind’’. Recent research is
beginning to illuminate what is taking place. According to Dresp-Langley (2012) and
referring mainly to neuro-psychological investigations, ‘‘… a large number of studies have
shown that non-conscious brain processes influence perceptions and representations
embedded in ongoing conscious experience’’ (p. 2). She argues, therefore, that far more is
‘‘known’’ than our deliberative, mindful and immediate thinking would suggest. And there
is experimental evidence that the individual may be unaware of the support which non-
conscious processing can give to conscious thoughts. So much so, that ‘‘… human deci-
sions and actions based on so-called intuition are quite often timely and pertinent and
reflect the astonishing ability of the brain to exploit non-conscious representations for
conscious action, effortlessly and effectively’’ (Dresp-Langley 2012, p. 8).
Fig. 1 Variations of the root concept of circularity in drawing and modelling Earth Shape and motion
concepts
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The exact mechanisms in the neuro-physiology remain unclear, but Edelman’s re-
entrant signalling in cortical circuits is the main contender: bottom-up representations
probably activate relevant structures but not sufficiently to trigger long-term memory
signals. The latter requires the coincidence of activity among several neural circuits. With
a critical amount of connectivity between neural structures, re-entrant signalling triggers
conscious experience. Generalising beyond this, memory is therefore ‘‘… a dynamic,
recategorical system property, not a fixed storage of all the variants of a scene, say of a
familiar room…’’ (Edelman 2006, p. 59).
According to Rosenfield (1988), throughout the twentieth century an erroneous ‘‘fixed
storage’’ view of memory persisted, influencing the work undertaken by researchers in
several fields. It did so despite the prominent psychologists, e.g. James, Bartlett (Bartlett
used the term constructive memory), Piaget and Bransford—all of whom had earlier
stressed the activity involved in remembering (remembering is ‘‘re-membering’’) and that
any present context shapes the way in which recollection operates. Piaget, for example,
considered that ‘‘human knowledge is essentially active’’ and was ‘‘opposed to the view of
knowledge as a copy, a passive copy of reality’’ (Piaget 1970, p. 15). Clancey’s lengthy
and detailed review of Rosenfield’s text published in Artificial Intelligence (Clancey 1991)
strove emphatically to disabuse researchers in that field of the notion that memory con-
sisted of ‘‘addressable, localizable, retrievable structures (stored representations)’’ (p. 257).
Perhaps a number of twenty-first century researchers in developmental and educational
research need similar reminders about the nature of recollection processes when young
people, or adults, reason during interviews designed to reveal how they grasp ideas and
form an understanding of the world around them.
In respect of the present paper, we chose to analyse a set of interview data focusing
specifically on inter-modal concept creation to provide a test of this recent thinking by
neuroscientists and to challenge existing research in the field of children’s cosmologies,
research which, thus far, has under-theorised the nature of the conceptual knowledge which
is tapped during interrogative dialogue. ESM studies continue to be a rich field for
exploring preschool and in-school concept acquisitions and their inter-relationships. The
investigation should provide a test of this neglected aspect of that developmental research
through focusing on what remembering is now thought to entail.
4 An Empirical Study
4.1 Background
The investigation involved detailed one-to-one interviewing of young people regarding
their grasp of the shapes and motions of the Earth, Sun and Moon. In the light of the
literature reviewed above, we looked closely at the relationships between what was being
conveyed by subjects via the aforementioned modes (verbal explanation, drawing and
modelling), particularly where subjects switched between what they said, what they drew
and how they created and manipulated their play-dough models. We sought to explore how
the substance of what subjects were expressing altered and in what ways when they
changed modes, and whether there were any patterns relating to the ages of the young
people concerned. For example, given what is known developmentally about shifts from
geocentric to heliocentric ideas about the Earth and the Sun, would there always be
consistencies between a child’s explanations, drawings and what they modelled, or might
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the act of modelling result in a change of mind (particularly within the dynamic context of
Socratic dialogue during Piagetian interviews)? Or, with even younger children, how do
changes from disc-shaped to spherical conceptions of the Earth manifest themselves?
Because of their dynamic 3D nature, the models created by children would allow them, in
association with pertinent questions from the researcher, to clarify their ideas of shape and
motion. Verbal language acts as a universal medium and modality and as such is the
foundation of interpretation (although problematic with young children age 3–5 and in
ethnographic research). Drawing provides a 2D perspective, but it takes plastic modelling
to enable critical comparison between modalities. Possible cognitive conflicts resulting
from a child’s failure to interconnect their thinking in different modes, and attempts to
resolve them, should be manifest as switching of model shape or motion, and reflective of
processes similar to Edelman’s (2005) re-entrant signalling whereby information from
verbal language, 2D drawings and 3D models are compared. The term cognitive conflict (or
conceptual conflict) as used by developmental psychologists refers to instances where an
individual may face inconsistencies between two (or more) of their thoughts. Piaget’s
notion of equilibration alludes to the natural tendency for the individual to try to reconcile
these (see Piaget 1985). In Schnotz and Preuß’s (1997) review of the literature on con-
ceptual change, the authors state that: ‘‘conceptual change is a radical restructuring of an
individual’s intuitive theory—a sudden shift to a new perspective based on alternative core
concepts and new relationships between them’’ (Schnotz and Preuß 1997, p. 187).
Researchers (see, for example, Dreyfus et al. 1990) have debated whether or under what
conditions conflicting thoughts are actually reconciled—with old conceptions being
replaced by new (different/better) understandings, or whether both are maintained, i.e. that
old and new conceptions coexist. Switching between such conceptions is therefore pos-
sible, indeed rather common. Thus, in the context of the present research, we sought to
explore inter-modal as well as intra-modal switching, hoping to illuminate conceptual
changes detectable when subjects try to reconcile conflicting thoughts, and/or images, and/
or models. Referring to the neurological revelations of Edelman, it is likely that re-entrant
signalling accounts for cognitive conflict and switching as part of a dynamic system.
An example in the present context is that a child may say that he/she believes that the
Earth is ‘‘round’’ as a result of verbal information from teachers, parents and peers, but
may not have thought too much about what this means until asked to draw the Earth. A 2D
representation lacks depth in two senses: it lacks linguistic precision and it is ‘‘flat’’.
Analogy by the interviewer asking: ‘‘Round like a ball or round like a disc (pancake)?’’ can
help to clarify what is meant; the child is forced to question himself/herself on what
‘‘round’’ means, to resolve the ambiguity in ‘‘roundness’’. Modelling in three dimensions
provides the child with the means to express the concept, limited only by their concept skill
or ability to create and express (i.e. model) the concept c.f. Barsalou’s multi-modal concept
skill (Barsalou 2003) and Clancey (1999). Sometimes it is only when asked to compare the
three outputs from different modalities that the child experiences a ‘‘Eureka moment’’ and,
at best, realises that they have a coherent concept of the Earth and its ‘‘roundness’’.
4.2 Research Questions
Refining our thinking about what we sought to examine in this area of children’s cos-
mologies, we considered four research questions (RQs) in the light of the key literature.
Would there be evidence that:
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RQ1 (a) Does thinking involve mutually supportive, self-correcting and simultaneously
adjusting processes instigated by different modalities—all the time, naturally, in
accord with Edelman’s re-entrant signalling?
RQ1 (b) Is ‘‘memory non-representational and are concepts the outcome of the brain’s
mapping its own perceptual maps leading to generalities or ‘universals’’’
(Edelman 2005, p. 104)?
RQ2 (a) Does memory, consisting not in the storage and retrieval of symbols, result from
a dynamical process of activation, whereby concepts reflect deep links between
perceptual motor skills and higher-level cognition (c.f. Clancey 1999)?
RQ2 (b) Are concepts skills or simulators for constructing idiosyncratic representations
(Barsalou 2003)?
Addressing these questions in the context of ESM should provide both a test of new
neuroscientific thinking about remembering and allow the reconsideration of previous
researches that have overlooked the inter-relationships between what subjects can describe,
draw or model. An important rider to the research strategy is to recognise the differences
between the semi-structured situations we set up and what might pertain with individuals in
more natural settings where there are fewer cues and constraints (as may be more often the
case in class teaching sessions or private study and learning). The interview data which
follow certainly show that individuals vary in the extent of the switching—the inter-modal
cross-referencing—they make and therefore in the integration of their thinking. The
experimental strategy limits the generalisations we might make to the non-constrained/
non-facilitated circumstances that occur in everyday life. Thus, it has to be acknowledged
that the research questions set out above, particularly RQ2 (b), are framed in that light. The
testing of the research question is limited by the very nature of the strategy deployed.
The overall strategy and research questions required a close scrutiny of qualitative
data in order to permit comparisons with the findings from previous researches which
have overlooked inter-modal considerations. However, previous investigations (including
our own) have often also looked at quantitative data in the search for possible effects of
gender and country of origin (culture) and ethnicity, and whether repeated surveying,
even years apart, would be influential (developmental effects are of course easily
demonstrated). We therefore considered that a secondary analysis should also check
these variables for the subjects involved in the circumstances of the new analysis.
Potentially, female and male interviewees, Chinese and New Zealand subjects, and in the
latter case NZ (European) and NZ (Ma¯ori) participants might react differently to the
close scrutiny required in semi-structured interviews when dialogue moves between
talking, drawing and modelling. Reassessing subjects over time might also reveal dif-
ferences between the groups involved. Our hypotheses are spelled out in the section
which follows.
5 Methods
The methodology was based on three main research efforts: (a) the pioneering work of
Nussbaum and Novak (1976) and Nussbaum (1979) on children’s cosmologies; (b) the
early work of Napier (1956) and Elliot and Connolly (1984) into the dexterity of the human
hand; and (c) the more recent research of Chien et al. (2010), Lin et al. (2002) on clas-
sification of children’s hand movements. The procedure utilised Piagetian semi-structured
interviews based on an extensive Interview Guide with three media of expression affording
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multi-modal responses: verbal language, drawing and play-dough modelling. The inter-
views investigated children’s concepts of the Motion of the Earth through observation of
changes in the shadow of a shadow stick, followed by drawing the motion of the Earth.
Children also observed the Moon in daylight and traced the phases of the Moon over a
month. The children then drew and modelled the shape of the Earth, Sun and Moon. The
concept of ‘‘Identity with Earth’’ was also explored by drawing and using models of ‘‘Self’’
and ‘‘a Friend on the other side of the world’’; and gravity, explored by investigating the
trajectory of dropped and thrown balls, and falling water, providing further insights into
their Earth Shape notions. Finally, children modelled the motion of the Earth, Sun and
Moon using their own models (see Bryce and Blown 2006, 2007, 2012, 2013; Blown and
Bryce 2006, 2010, 2012).
Three important elements of the interview technique are illustrated in the first protocol
extract given in Sect. 6. Firstly, in the case of Earth Shape, an analogy was used to
distinguish between spherical- and disc-like shapes. Secondly, in the case of Sun Shape
modelling, we avoided asking questions while drawing or modelling was in progress so as
not to disturb children. It has been found through experience (as in this case) that children
tend not to engage in verbal dialogue while deep in thought during other modal activities
such as modelling. However, this is countered by the need to know what the child is
doing/thinking at each stage. Hence, a balance has to be struck between allowing thought
to flow freely, and knowing what is going on in the child’s mind. Thirdly, as in the example
from Moon Shape modelling, drawings were used to cross-reference shape concepts from
other modalities by having each child’s drawing of the shapes of the Earth, Sun and Moon
nearby to refer to. This was usually used when modelling the phases of the Moon, when
children were encouraged to replicate in play-dough the shapes that they had described
verbally and drawn earlier in the interview. This procedure also has its pros and cons. On
the one hand, modelling phases can give children clearer insights into the scientific nature
of phases as semi-spherical areas of the Moon visible from the Earth because of their
illumination by sunlight. On the other hand, modelling phases could reinforce cultural
ideas such as that the Moon really does have different physical shapes at different times of
the month (particularly relevant in China, and Ma¯ori culture in New Zealand where the
lunar calendar continues to be used for cultural festivals, and traditional activities such as
sowing and harvesting crops, and fishing).
5.1 Settings and Samples
The interviews took place in local school and kindergarten settings in Featherston,
Wairarapa, New Zealand (NZ) (2004–2005), and Changchun, Jilin, China (2005–2006),
where the researcher (2nd author) initially spent considerable time periods with the staff
and pupils, and the local communities concerned, to become familiar with their circum-
stances and to be known to the volunteer subjects taking part. During the interviews, the
researcher spoke (in English) to the children taking part, his words being translated into
Chinese in Changchun. Subjects’ replies (in the case of the Chinese subjects, via the
translator) were recorded and later transcribed for analysis. The subjects were asked to
make drawings with paper, pencils and felt pen, and models with play-dough provided for
the purpose. Drawings and models were retained/photographed for subsequent analysis.
Verbal interviews, drawing sessions and play-dough modelling were recorded on audio-
tape, and the latter were also recorded on video tape which afforded analysis of hand
movements. There were 360 participants in all, age 3–13, including 294 from NZ (158
boys and 136 girls) and 66 from China (34 boys and 32 girls). Of these, 36 children from
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NZ and 36 from China took part in longitudinal cross-cultural and cross-age comparisons;
the subjects being matched on socio-economic background with approximately equal
numbers of boys and girls in each group, and a similar control group for the follow-up
studies (NZ: 2005; China: 2006).
As described previously, the research was based on multi-modal, one-to-one, Piagetian
semi-structured interviews with Socratic dialogue conducted along ethnographic research
principles. The participants were selected by class teachers who matched children
according to general ability, socio-economic background, age, ethnicity and gender to
achieve typical cross sections of age groups in each school community and culture.
Although all responses were recorded and analysed, space precludes full reporting. The
verbal protocols, drawings, play-dough models and modelling selected for comment are
typical examples of their age group.
5.2 Data Analysis, Categorisation and Coding
The data were gathered with the help of an extensive Interview Guide, extracts of which
are reported in the protocols (see also Bryce and Blown 2012; Blown and Bryce 2012). The
second author did the initial coding of children’s responses using the Cosmological
Concept Categorisation Scheme developed by the authors. This had previously been
independently assessed periodically by two astronomy educators from Carter National
Observatory, Wellington, New Zealand (see Bryce and Blown 2012; Tables 1 and 2
below). The same coders were invited to independently code interview audiotapes, chil-
dren’s drawings, photographs of play-dough models and video protocols representing 12 %
of the comparative sample to provide measures of independent coding reliability. These
were reviewed to achieve consensus and identify discrepancies with a resulting inter-coder
agreement of 92–96 %; Cohen’s kappa j = .92–.94.
Operational guidance regarding the pursuit of each of the research questions in turn is
included in Sect. 6.
Additionally, and with respect to RQ2 (a) in particular, an attempt was made to quantify
children’s dexterous skill as they modelled shapes and motions, which we termed hand
motion skill and motion concept skill, respectively. Our reasoning had been that dexterous
skill in modelling concepts could be an exemplar of concepts as skills and simulations as
hypothesised by Barsalou (2003) and that the elements of hand motion skill for modelling
both shape and motion of ESM could be placed on an ordinal scale from least difficult to
most difficult to perform. However, this proved to be much more difficult than originally
anticipated (and ultimately unsuccessful in relation to the research questions pursued here),
partly because our analysis was based on observation of video tape data stored on DVD
rather than on more sophisticated techniques such as computer modelling capturing hand
motion in image sequences (see Chien et al. 2010; Lin et al. 2002). For example, when
attempting to measure hand motion skill, we were unable to capture rapid fine movements
during shape modelling—motions which enabled older children to make spherical shapes
with minimal gross hand motions such as rolling, confounding quantification based on
summing observable gross motions (such as rolling between hands, rolling to and fro on
desk, circular rolling on desk). And the full range of hand motions when modelling rotation
and revolution simultaneously (some of which were hidden from view) was virtually
impossible to quantify objectively into an ordinal scale of motion concept skill (see Jaimee
protocol below).
To counter these difficulties with quantitative results, we decided to report the gross
hand motions in qualitative form in selected protocols to at least yield a sense of the skills
58 T. G. K. Bryce, E. J. Blown
123
being used in each case. The quantitative results were limited to categorising the highest
concept held by the child in each element in each modality on a ten-point ordinal scale
from least scientific to most scientific for each concept: ESM Shape and ESM Motion.
Thus, rather than classifying (categorising) the process of dexterous-concept skills being
used to create a shape or motion, the concept categorisation scheme was used to classify
the final product of the interview, drawing or modelling activity. The Kolmogorov–
Smirnov two-sample test at an alpha level of .05 was then used to compare the means of
groups based on the classification of children’s concepts.
The evidence from the current studies strongly supports the proposition that children’s
cosmologies are dynamic in the sense of being in a constant state of flux influenced by
Table 1 Shape modelling concept categories
Earth Shape categories
10. Smooth ball/sphere
9. Rough ball
8. Dual hemisphere (lower one representing ground; upper one representing atmosphere/sky)
7. Hemisphere or bun
6. Smooth disc
5. Rough disc
4. Square or rectangular slab
3. Thin irregular slab or pancake or thin spread layer (synonymous with earth)
2. Irregular lump (flat)
1. Irregular lump (ball) or none (uncertain)
Sun Shape categories
10. Spherical or star like (consistent with Sun as a star)
9. Smooth ball/sphere with rays and/or prominences
8. Rough ball with rays and/or prominences
7. Smooth ball/sphere
6. Rough ball or bun
5. Disc with rays
4. Disc
3. Happy face (animate)
2. Irregular pancake
1. Irregular lump
Moon Shape categories
10. Ball/sphere with phases (three or more shapes)
9. Ball/sphere with crescent (two shapes)
8. Smooth ball/sphere (may have craters)
7. Rough ball or bun (may have craters)
6. Disc with phases (three or more shapes)
5. Disc or bun with crescent (two shapes)
4. Disc or pancake
3. Semi-disc (half pancake)
2. Crescent
1. Irregular lump or lumps
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interaction of everyday and scientific ideas stimulated by questioning and Socratic dia-
logue, and supported by multi-modal opportunities (drawing and play-dough modelling).
The present analysis therefore merited reconsiderations of comparable data from the
perspective of non-representational memory that ideas are dynamic and multi-modal,
actively created at the point of recall. Skill in creating static and dynamic concepts such as
the shape and motion of the Earth, Sun and Moon in multi-modal formats will increase
with age so; in line with our previous findings concerning developmental trends in China
and New Zealand, we hypothesised that:
H1 The dynamic structure of memory and concept creation will be similar in both
genders and common across cultures [NZ boys v. NZ girls; China boys v. China girls; NZ
v. China; NZ European v. NZ Ma¯ori].
H2 Repeated interviews in this longitudinal study will lead to enhanced modelling skills
and/or more advanced shape and motion concepts.
Table 2 Motion modelling concept categories
Earth Motion categories
9. Rotates on axis and revolves around the Sun
8. Rotates on vertical or tilted axis (spherical)
7. Revolves around Sun (but does not rotate)
6. Rolls on horizontal axis (spherical)
5. Rotates on axis (disc)
4. Moves continuously in some way; e.g. across sky
3. Moves intermittently; e.g. only at night-time; rolls to and fro
2. Stationary
1. Uncertain
Sun Motion categories
8. Rotates on axis (spherical)
7. Revolves in some way
6. Rotates on axis and revolves around Earth
5. Revolves around Earth
4. Stationary
3. Moves in some way; e.g. rises and sets; moves across sky; rotates (disc); rolls
2. Animate; e.g. follows us; moves behind clouds
1. Uncertain
Moon Motion categories
8. Rotates on axis and revolves around Earth
7. Revolves around Earth
6. Rotates on axis (spherical)
5. Moves with Earth as Earth revolves around Sun
4. Moves in some way; e.g. rises and sets; moves across sky; rotates (disc)
3. Stationary
2. Animate; e.g. follows us; moves behind clouds
1. Uncertain
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6 Results and Discussion
In this section, we present a number of extracts from the interview protocols to indicate the
extent of the support for the research questions and hypotheses stated earlier. There were
numerous supporting examples throughout the sample and the extracts chosen for illus-
tration and presented below are broadly representative of age, gender and ethnicity (twelve
consisting of 5 Chinese Han, 4 New Zealand European and 3 Ma¯ori). These reveal the
switching taking place between modalities as children are questioned about the shape and
motion of the Earth, Sun and Moon. The sample numbers from which these exemplars
were drawn are larger than in many similar studies, allowing confidence for our
conclusions.
The qualitative findings are grouped by research question, RQ1 through RQ4, and these
are followed by the numerical data indicating the testing of the two hypotheses. The first
protocol, that of Zhang Lan Ge (a 7-year-old female of Han ethnicity in Junior Primary
School in China), is more or less complete and shows the structure of the interview with
few interruptions. This includes details of the hand movements used to model shape and
motion. We have concluded each of the extract analyses with a short discussion relevant to
the aspect in question, thereby enabling the final discussion to stand back from the detail
and be more comprehensible.
6.1 Multi-Modal Thought in Tune with Edelman’s Re-Entrant Signalling
Is there any evidence that thinking involves mutually supportive, self-correcting and
simultaneously adjusting processes instigated by different modalities—all the time, natu-
rally, in accord with Edelman’s re-entrant signalling? (RQ1 a). Confirming indicators:
Child refers to all three modalities during interview with a variety of different responses
from each modality requiring active integration by the child. Self-correcting processes are
reflected in change of shape or modification to motion in response to Socratic dialogue.
Disconfirming indicators: Child only repeats responses in same modality as previously
used, no self-correction apparent. The following examples illustrate how children adjust
their thinking—sometimes within a particular mode, often when they switch between
modes.
6.1.1 Zhang Lan Ge (China: Han: Female: Age 7 years 0 months: Junior Primary
School)
R. Make the shape of the Earth with the green play-dough.
R. [I give child an irregular lump of play-dough about 40 to 50 mm in diameter (but not
spherical; to encourage creative modelling); similar ‘lumps’ of play-dough being used
for all modelling of ESM.]
C. (Makes shape of Earth by gripping, pressing between hands, moulding between
hands, circular rolling between hands, patting, pressing on desk, and circular rolling on
desk).
R. What shape have you made there?
C. Round.
R. Round like a ball, or round like a pancake?
C. A ball.
R. [Earth spherical (people live inside): Earth Shape Category 7: see Table 1].
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(See also Earth Shape Categorisation Scheme in Bryce and Blown (2013): Category 7:
Earth Shaped like a ball cut in half: Ground and Sky inside the Earth: people live
‘‘inside’’ transparent dome of the Earth).
Note that Earth Shape Categories 7 and 8 are similar; both have people living inside the
Earth on the flat surface (Ground) of a truncated sphere, but Category 7 has the Sky
within the upper dome, whereas Category 8 has the Sky outside the dome as Space.
Zhang’s initial responses could also be interpreted as a ‘‘counter example’’ or
‘‘disconfirming indicator’’ of the RQ. From a single-modality perspective, Zang’s model
appears to be spherical, but her verbal responses and drawings reveal that she believed
that people lived inside the Earth.
Modelling the Shape of the Sun
R. Make the shape of the Sun with the red play-dough.
R. [I give child a lump of play-dough.]
C. (Makes shape of Sun by gripping, pressing between hands, pressing on desk, circular
rolling on desk, squeezing with fingers, and moulding on desk to form sphere; then
pinching equatorial edge to form spikes/rays. Forms some of the latter by pinching
pieces off of ball, horizontal rolling small piece of play-dough on desk, then re-attaching
as rays).
R. What are the spiky bits?
C. (Does not respond—concentrating on modelling rays).
R. [I wait until child has completed modelling].
R. What are the spiky bits?
C. The sunlight.
R. [Sun Model is spherical with rays: Sun Shape Concept Category 7: see Table 1].
Note that here the child appears to have switched off the verbal language modality for a
while in favour of giving maximum attention to the modelling modalities. Although at
first sight a ‘‘counter example’’, the verbal language mode could be activated by the
intervention of the researcher if he was prepared to interrupt the child’s concentration on
modelling rays as in the final question.
Modelling the Shape of the Moon
R. Make the shapes of the Moon with the yellow play-dough.
R. [I give child a lump of play-dough.]
R. [I introduce child’s drawing of Moon for cross-reference].
R. You drew two shapes of the Moon (I indicate child’s drawing). If you can make one
with that (I hand child a lump of yellow play-dough; and one with that (I give child a
second lump of yellow play-dough).
C. (Makes first shape of Moon by breaking play-dough into smaller pieces twice; then
rolling horizontally between hands; then rolling on desk; to create a cylindrical shape).
R. What shape have you made there?
C. A banana.
R. What shape have you made the other one?
C. (Makes second Moon Shape by circular rolling between hands).
R. Is the other one like a ball?
C. Yes.
R. [Moon Model ball plus crescent: Moon Shape Concept Category 7: see Table 1].
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Modelling the Motion of the Earth, Sun, and Moon with play-dough Models
R. [The play-dough models of the ESM remain from the Shape study].
R. Does the Earth move?
C. Yes.
R. Show me how the Earth moves?
C. (Indicates spinning motion).
R. It spins?
C. At night it moves like this (models anti-clockwise motion looking down on North Pole)
and in the morning it moves this way (models clockwise motion looking down on North
Pole).
R. How long does it take to move like that (I model anti-clockwise motion)?
C. An hour
R. How long does it take to move like that (I model clockwise motion)?
C. An hour
R. [Highest Earth Motion Concept Category 4: moves continuously: see Table 2].
R. Does the Sun move?
C. Yes.
R. Show me how the Sun moves?
C. (Indicates a spinning and cross-ways motion).
R. It spins and moves across the sky?
C. Yes.
R. How long does it take to spin once (I model spinning motion)?
C. Half an hour.
R. How long does it take to move across the sky (I model crosswise motion)?
C. The Sun follows the car.
R. If this was a little person walking (I introduce model person) show me how the Sun
follows?
C. (Shows Sun spinning and following with right hand; and person walking with left
hand).
R. The Sun follows like that?
C. And at the same time it spins.
R. [Highest Earth Motion Concept Category 2: see Table 2].
R. Does the Moon move?
C. Yes.
R. Show me how the Moon moves?
C. It spins and also follows the car.
R. If that’s a person (I introduce model person again) show me how the Moon
follows?
C. (Shows Moon spinning and following with right hand; person walking with left hand).
R. [Highest Earth Motion Concept Category 2: see Table 2].
Although Zhang Lan Ge knows that the Earth rotates, she has yet to form a complete
concept of the continuity of Earth Motion or associated concepts of time such as the
concept and duration of a day. Consequently, her concepts of Sun and Moon Motion are
grounded in a geocentric perspective, and her everyday observations of relative motion are
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translated into semi-animistic notions such as that the Sun and Moon follow us when we
drive in a car. Modelling relative motion using play-dough models of the Sun and Moon
together with small model people enabled children to share their ideas in a way that is
much more meaningful than could be accomplished with verbal language or drawing.
Although Zhang Lan Ge appeared to be aware of the rotation of both the Sun and the Moon
and may have learned this from school or other sources of astronomical knowledge, it is
more likely that she is making an analogy with Earth’s rotation. Most children of her age
have been introduced to elements of the heliocentric hypothesis such as the rotation of the
Earth on its axis in a day and revolution of the Earth about the Sun in a year. Some may
also have been taught of the Moon’s revolution about the Earth in a month. But few would
have been taught of the Moon’s rotation in a month or the Sun’s rotation (in 26 days).
However, as we have argued elsewhere (see Bryce and Blown 2006, 2013; Blown and
Bryce 2010) rather than being interpreted as ‘‘knowledge in pieces’’, Zhang Lan Ge’s ideas
should be thought of as genuine attempts to form a complete picture of the world
(framework theory) from a variety of knowledge sources, both scientific and cultural,
combined with her own observations.
6.1.2 Jaimee (NZ: European: Female: Age 11 years 0 months: Senior Primary School)
Modelling Daytime and Night-time
R. With the Earth, could you show me what daytime and night-time look like?
R. Imagine that the sunlight coming in the window is the real sunlight (shining on the
Earth).
R. [I indicate sunlight shining on play-dough model Earth.]
R. Could you pick it up and show me daytime and night-time?
C. [Picks up play-dough model of Earth with right hand].
R. Where’s daytime if that’s the Earth?
C. Daytime would be on this side (indicates sunlit side) and night-time would be on this
side (indicates shaded side) because the Sun shines on one side at a time (rotates model
Earth with both hands).
R. How do we get daytime and night-time?
C. As the Earth moves around (rotates model Earth using both hands).
Modelling the Motion of the Earth
R. As it (the Earth) spins?
C. Yes.
R. How long does it take to spin once?
C. A day (rotates model Earth with right hand).
R. Does the Earth move in any other way?
R. [Earlier in her observational astronomy session (observing the motion of a shadow in
sunlight) Jaimee had said that the Earth rotated and orbited the Sun, modelled it rotating
and revolving, and drew it rotating in a day and revolving around the Sun in a year. I
seek to clarify to what extent she has changed her mind and why].
C. [Indicates partial orbit around Moon with right hand holding model Earth].
C. Oh—it doesn’t (move in any other way)! It spins! (returns to rotating model Earth in
right hand then both hands).
R. [Child self-correcting].
R. It doesn’t (move in any other way)?
64 T. G. K. Bryce, E. J. Blown
123
C. No (continues to rotate model Earth in right hand).
R. It doesn’t move around the Sun—or anything like that?
R. [Recalling child’s earlier statement that the Earth revolves around the Sun I use
Socratic dialogue to jog her memory.]
C. I think so (stops rotating model Earth with right hand).
R. Does it?
C. Yes (moves model Earth to proximity of model Sun).
R. Can you show me how the Earth moves then?
C. [Models Earth rotating on axis with right hand and going around the Sun with right
arm and wrist while holding Sun stationary in left hand].
R. [To see Earth Motion more clearly I offer to hold the model of the Sun].
R. I’ll hold the Sun: you show me the Earth moving.
C. [Models Earth rotating on axis with both hands and going around the Sun].
R. [Active integration by child].
R. It’s spinning and going around the Sun?
C. Yes.
R. How long does it take to go around the Sun once?
C. A year.
R. [Highest Earth Motion Concept Category 6: see Table 2].
Jaimee’s understanding of the motion of the Earth encompasses the main scientific con-
cepts of rotation, revolution and associated concepts of time (day and year). The sequence
where her handswere indicating a partial orbit of theMoonwhile herwordswereweighing up
the pros and cons of rotation versus revolution is revealing in that they show the two-way
interplay between mental conceptions and physical actions argued by Edelman (2005). They
also show the power of gesture4 in communicating ideas and that ‘‘… gestures and speech are
most appropriately regarded as two sides of a single underlying verbal-gestural process of
constructing and presenting meanings’’ (McNeill 1992, p. 24; see also Gallagher 2005).
Based on these theories, a possible explanation would be that while modelling the Earth
rotating, Jaimee’s long-term memory (nonrepresentational according to Edelman) was
activated by the open-ended question: Does the Earth move in any other way?
This may have caused her to recall the previous context in which she modelled the Earth
rotating and revolving. This triggered neural pathways enabling concept creation which
were transmitted to motor areas capable of producing motions by the hands to model the
concept. Once the hands started to move, there would be feedback through the motor
system to the neural pathways to compare the physical motion with the mental conception
(dynamic concept) of the motion (see Edelman 2005). This would explain Jaimee’s
exclamation: Oh—it doesn’t! (move in any other way) It spins! However, Jaimee realises
that this explanation is incomplete and does not match her gesture (partial orbit around the
Moon) or her long-term memory (from the earlier interview) that the Earth rotates on its
axis and revolves around the Sun. The second question (It doesn’t move around the Sun or
anything like that?) focuses on the conflict and causes Jaimee to resolve the mismatch
between concept and action. At this stage, Jaimee pauses to think (I think so) and ceases to
rotate the model Earth. Then, convinced by feedback from comparison with long-term
memory, she realises that the Earth not only rotates but also revolves—but not around the
4 Althoughwe recognise the value of gesture and facial expressions in communicationwedid not include themas
majormodalities for reasons of privacy. In cooperationwith school head teachers,we arranged the video recorder
so that in general it only showed children’s hands against a background of the desktop. This excluded gestures
such as hands wide apart (which could have included facial features and revealed the identity of the child).
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Moon around the Sun. She responds Yes and returns to modelling the Earth rotating on its
axis and revolving around the Sun.
Modelling the Motion of the Sun
R. Does the Sun move?
C. No.
R. [Most children of this age consider the Sun to be stationary].
R. [Highest Sun Motion Concept Category 8: see Table 2].
Modelling the Motion of the Moon
R. Does the Moon move?
C. Yes.
R. How does the Moon move?
C. Around the Earth.
R. Can you show me that as well then?
C. [Models Moon revolving around Earth first using right hand, then using both hands].
R. How long does it take to go round the Earth once?
C. A day.
R. Does the Moon spin (I model)?
C. Yes.
R. How long does it take to spin once?
C. A year.
R. How long to go round the Earth?
C. Oh no! That’s a year. It spins once in a day.
R. [Child self-corrects].
R. [Highest Moon Motion Concept Category 7: see Table 2].
Although Jaimee knows and can model the main Moon Motions (revolution and rota-
tion), her knowledge of associated concepts of time is inaccurate as shown by her state-
ment: C. Oh no! That’s a year. It spins once in a day in response to the researcher’s: R.
How long (does the Moon take) to go round the Earth?
Nevertheless, her responses indicate the self-correcting processes that are a character-
istic feature of what must follow from Edelman’s (2005) re-entry signalling.
6.1.3 Lu¨ Shi Hao (China: Han: Male: Age 8 years 8 months: Junior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape, Nature and Structure of the Moon with Play-dough
R. Could you make the shape of the Moon?
C. [Commences to mould play-dough into ball shape].
R. You made (drew) four Moon Shapes (I show child drawing)—you can make all of
these?
R. [I hand child four lumps of yellow play-dough].
C. [Makes 1st Moon Shape—a thin crescent—by circular rolling between hands to form
a sphere; then pressing between hands to form disc; then tearing segment from disc].
C. [Makes 2nd Moon Shape—a crescent—by repeating the above process].
C. [Makes 3rd Moon Shape—a thick crescent—by rolling into ball by circular rolling
between hands; then squeezing and teasing to form disc; then moulding into semi-sphere].
C. [Makes 4th Moon Shape—a ball—by collecting together discarded pieces of play-
dough and rolling and moulding them between hands].
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R. [Child appears to have completed modelling task so I ask:]
R. What shape have you made there (I indicate ball-shaped model Moon)?
C. [Considers].
R. Is that like a ball or like a pancake?
C. [Commences to flatten ball by pressing on desk with both hands].
R. Like a pancake?
C. Yes (continues to flatten model—then flips over and presses on reverse side to form
disc).
R. [Moon Model disc with phases: Moon Shape Concept Category 6: see Table 1].
Lu¨ Shi Hao’s modelling of Moon shapes demonstrates that, in common with Chinese
children of his age, he was acquainted with two coexisting concepts of theMoon: the cultural
Moon (yue` liang) which changes shape each month and is the basis of the Chinese lunar
calendar, and the scientific Moon (yue` qiu´) which is always spherical. This difference is
shown by Lu¨ Shi Hao modelling the scientific full Moon Shape as a ball; then modelling the
cultural full Moon Shape as a disc or pancake (bing); the crescent-shaped phases being
associated with both concepts, i.e. with the scientific Moon as sections of a sphere, and with
the cultural Moon as sections of a disc as seen in the night sky. The sudden change from
modelling the Moon as ball shaped to modelling it as a disc was triggered by the question
sequence:
R. What shape have you made there (indicating ball-shaped model Moon)?
R. Is that like a ball or like a pancake?
This appeared to activate a process of self-correction to resolve the cognitive conflict of
matching the shape of the full Moon to phases modelled as sections of a disc. The ready
transformation from ball to disc afforded by play-dough suggests active integration of
shape concepts based on personal observation, cultural influences and teaching. The final
model of a disc-shaped Moon with matching phases (a variety of sections of a disc)
represents the child’s attempt to integrate differing inputs from multiple modalities.
6.2 Non-Representational Nature of Memory, and Concepts as Generalities
or Universals
Are there grounds for believing that ‘‘memory is non-representational and concepts are the
outcome of the brain mapping its own perceptual maps leading to generalities or ‘universals’’’
(Edelman2005, p. 104)?Confirming indicators: Child switches between 1D, 2Dand 3Dmental
constructions of ESM shapes andmotions.Disconfirming indicators:No switching evident for
either shape or motion concepts, either immediately at that juncture in the interview or sub-
sequently. Here, the examples illustrate the interplay of all three modalities and in doing so
lending clarification to the meaning of ideas. They also show that children can hold both
everyday and scientific versions of concepts simultaneously, or may switch between them.
6.2.1 Alistair (NZ: European: Male: Age 10 years 9 months: Senior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape of the Earth
R. Can you make the shape of the Earth with the green play-dough?
C. [Models shape of Earth by gripping play-dough with right hand; pressing between
hands; moulding between hands; and gentle pressure with right, left and both hands].
R. [Model is spherical: Earth Shape Concept Category 10: see Table 1].
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R. What shape have you made there?
C. A circle.
R. Is it like a ball or a disc?
C. Ball.
Alistair’s use of the term ‘‘circle’’ to describe sphericity is common for children of his
age. Although the use of cultural models is questionable (see Bryce and Blown 2006), we
justify their use here where children have already created their models and are matching
them to an artefact (wooden disc or tennis ball) rather than selecting a shape from a range
of models with no modelling. It does however raise the question of how the concept of
circularity is created (see Fig. 1).
Modelling the Shape of the Sun
R. (Can you) make the shape of the Sun with the red play-dough?
C. [Models shape of Sun by gripping play-dough with his right hand; pressing between
hands; moulding between hands; and pinching rays/spikes.]
R. [Model is a smooth ball with rays: Sun Shape Concept Category 9: see Table 1].
R. What are the points?
C. The Sun’s got thermo-nuclear energy.
R. What shape is that then (indicating model)?
C. It’s a circle.
R. Is it a circle like a ball or a circle like a disc?
C. Like a ball.
R. Do the spikes come out of it all over or only on the edge?
C. On the edge.
The source of the Sun’s energy was discussed earlier in the interview when children
were asked general questions such as Tell me about the Sun? These were not probed in
depth here; but it is noted that, although Alistair is aware of the nature of the Sun’s radiant
energy, he is unable to fully translate this concept. He described the Sun as having rays and
drew it with spikes around its circumference, but he did not realise that his pictorial
representations were incomplete and that the rays emanated not from the 2D edge of a
circle but from the 3D spherical surface of the Sun. This example illustrates the advantage
of triangulating concepts from different media and modalities. It also highlights the need to
use three-dimensional models or visual aids such as computer graphics, videos, DVDs of
the Earth, Sun and Moon when teaching astronomy so that children can build more
complete concepts of the shape, structure and nature of these heavenly objects as planets,
stars and natural satellites rather than circular objects on a board or in a book. No matter
how well illustrated, the latter remain two-dimensional.
Modelling the Shape of the Moon
R. Can you make the shape of the Moon with the (yellow) play-dough? And if you
think that the Moon is different shapes—like you have drawn (I indicate child’s
drawing) then you can make these different shapes.
C. [Models 1st Moon Shape—a crescent—by gripping and squeezing with both hands;
pressing between hands; rolling between hands; moulding between hands; breaking the
play-dough lump into smaller pieces; and gripping and curving into a crescent].
R. Is that (I indicate model of crescent Moon) the same as is this one over here (I
indicate drawing of crescent Moon)?
C. Yes.
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C. [Models 2nd Moon Shape—a disc—by shaping using one hand as an anvil; pressing
and squeezing with fingers; moulding and shaping with fingers; squeezing and teasing
into a disc; and patting with hands].
R. What shape is that there?
C. Full.
R. Is that shape there (I indicate child’s disc-shaped model of Moon) like this (ball) or
that (disc)?
R. [I show child a ball and a disc to clarify].
C. A disc [selects disc].
R. That’s this one (I indicate drawing of full Moon)?
C. Yes.
R. [1st Model is crescent shaped; 2nd disc: Moon Shape Concept Category 4: see
Table 1].
Direct comparison between the children’s models and their earlier drawings usually
enabled conceptual conflict to be reduced leading to a clearer understanding of shape.
However, Alistair believes the Moon to be disc shaped, and models it as such. His drawing
of the full Moon as a circle being 2D is ambiguous, but his selection of the disc shape is
clear-cut. He has yet to develop the conceptual skill (see Barsalou 2003) that will enable
him to reason that if the Earth and Sun are spherical then it is likely that the Moon is also
spherical. His notion of the Moon being disc shaped is based on a 2D perspective grounded
in the concept of circularity rather than a 3D view of sphericity (see Fig. 1). This extract
from a typical child’s interview illustrates the interplay of all three modalities in clarifying
concepts and building meaning.
6.2.2 Li Xin (China: Han: Female: Age 9 years 9 months: Senior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape of the Sun
R. If you can make the shape of the Sun with the red play-dough?
C. [Makes ball-shaped model of the Sun by gripping, pressing between hands, circular
rolling between hands, and passing between hands].
R. What shape have you made there?
C. Round.
R. Is that round like a ball or round like a pancake?
C. Like a pancake.
R. It doesn’t look like a pancake?
C. The real Sun is like a pancake.
R. Can you make it the shape of the real Sun?
C. {Picks up spherical model of Sun and presses to disc using palm and back of right
hand using left hand as anvil, and finally patting with right hand].
R. [Final Sun Shape Model is a disc: Sun Shape Concept Category 4: see Table 1].
Here Li Xin appears to be differentiating between the spherical ‘‘scientific’’ Sun (as
taught by teachers in school) and the disc-shaped ‘‘real’’ or ‘‘everyday’’ Sun (as observed at
sunrise and sunset in the ‘‘real’’ world). Possibly, these two concepts coexisted in some
form (such as mental imagery) in the child’s memory—or the capacity to form them
coexisted in the non-representative neural substrate from which concepts are created by
both conscious and unconscious processes and mental skills (see Barsalou 2003; Edelman
2005). Note that Li Xin appears to represent a ‘‘disconfirming’’ example in terms of the
verbal modality in that despite the fact that she modelled the Sun as ball-shaped she
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describes it as ‘‘round’’ and ‘‘like a pancake’’ by analogy. However, although her verbal
description remains the same, her model switches from ball-shaped to disc-shaped.
6.2.3 Renee (NZ: Ma¯ori: Female: Age 12 years 3 months: Senior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape of the Earth
R. Can you make the shape of the Earth with the green play-dough?
C. [Models shape of Earth by gripping and squeezing with right, left and both hands;
pressing between hands; moulding between hands; pressing on desk; pressing with
fingers; rolling between hands; patting between hands; and gentle pressure with both
hands].
R. What shape are you making there?
C. Round like a ball.
R. [Final Earth Shape Model is spherical: Earth Shape Category 10: see Table 1].
Modelling the Shape of the Sun
R. (Can you) make the shape of the Sun with the red play-dough?
C. [Models shape of Sun by gripping play-dough with right, left, and both hands;
pressing between hands; moulding between hands; and passing/patting between hands].
R. What shape is that (I point to child’s model)?
C. Round like a ball as well.
R. [Final Sun Shape Model is a smooth ball: Sun Shape Category 7: see Table 1].
Modelling the Shape of the Moon
R. Make the shape of the Moon.
C. [Commences to model Moon by gripping and squeezing with left, right, and both
hands].
R. Now you made (drew) several shapes of the Moon—you made (drew) all of these
different shapes (I show child her drawing of Moon Shapes)—if you want to make all
of them you can (full Moon and five phases)—or you can make a few of them—if you
need more play-dough I can give you more—if you want to break it up and make all of
them I can leave the shapes (drawing) there (alongside the play-dough modelling
sheet) if you want to refer to them.
C. [Breaks play-dough into smaller lumps and creates lunar phases by pressing play-
dough on desk with right and left hands; pressing between hands; gripping and curving
into a crescent; curving crescent pressing with fingers on desk; pressing/squeezing with
fingers of left, right and both hands; moulding and shaping with fingers of right and left
hands; rolling between hands; moulding/shaping with fingers; and moulding
hemisphere.].
R. Just put them down here (I indicate modelling sheet) when you are ready.
C. [Models 1st Moon Shape—a crescent].
R. They can be anywhere on there (I indicate the modelling sheet)—they don’t have to
be all in a line (as in child’s drawing).
C. [Completes 1st crescent Moon Shape and places it on modelling sheet].
R. If you need any more play-dough just say so.
C. [Models 2nd Moon Shape—a semi-sphere—and places it on modelling sheet].
R. Good (conversational—not meant to imply evaluation).
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C. [Models 3rd Moon Shape—a sphere—and places it on modelling sheet].
R. Good (again conversational).
C. [Models 4th Moon Shape—another crescent—and places it on modelling sheet].
R. Right—are you happy with that?
C. Yes.
R. [Final Moon Shape Ball with phases: Moon Shape Category 9: see Table 1].
Modelling phases was thought to help older children to visualise sections of a spherical
body like the Moon.
Comparison between Shape Drawing and Shape Models
R. So that shape (I indicate child’s model of Earth) is more or less the same shape as
you drew there (I indicate child’s drawing of the Earth)?
C. Yes.
R. And that’s a ball shape?
C. Yes.
R. And the Sun—that’s the Sun Shape there (I indicate child’s model of Sun and
drawing of Sun)—another ball shape?
C. Yes.
R. What shape is that one there (I indicate child’s drawing of full Moon)?
C. That’s a round one (indicates drawing of full Moon with right hand and model of full
Moon with left hand].
C. That’s a crescent [indicates model of crescent Moon with left hand].
C. And that’s a half [indicates model of quarter Moon with left hand].
R. Is that basic shape like a ball as well (I indicate model of full Moon)?
C. Kind of (gestures ball shape by cupping hands)—hold it!
C. [Picks up play dough model of full Moon and rolls between hands in a circular motion].
R. Is it like a ball?
C. [Continues to roll model between hands].
R. Is it meant to be a ball?
C. Um—yes.
C. [Continues to shape model of full Moon].
R. It’s meant to be a ball?
C. [Places model back on modelling sheet].
R. So they’re all sections of a ball?
C. Yes.
R. The basic shape is a ball?
C. Yes.
Comparison between drawings and models helped to clarify shape concepts by comparing
2D concepts from the drawing media/modality with 3D concepts from the modelling
media/modality, using the media/modality of verbal language to facilitate matching. Renee’s
use of gesture to visualise the fullMoon also suggests comparisonwith some formof imagery in
memory through the kinesthetic modality. Her persistence in trying to create a perfectly
spherical model of the Moon also suggests some form of two-way comparison taking place
between a concept in hermind and the physicalmodel in her hands in real timewithmore or less
instant feedback (suggesting dynamic change at both ends of the process, i.e. changes to the
concept in mind shaping changes to the concept in hand and vice versa: a two-way dynamic
process incompatible with mental model theory, better explained by Barsalou/Edelman theory
andDonaldson (1978), than bymentalmodels).Matching the drawings andmodels also helped
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to clarify that the phases of the Moon do not constitute physical changes but are cultural
explanations for the apparent changes in shape as a result of varying degrees of illumination.
Modelling Ground and Sky
R. If this was the Earth (I indicate child’s play-dough model of the Earth) where
would the ground be?
C. Round here (cups right hand around model Earth just touching surface).
R. Where would the sky be?
C. Above (flattens hand a few cm above model Earth) – around it (moves hand
tangentially over top of model Earth).
R. All around?
C. Yes.
Modelling the ground and sky gives insights into children’s concepts of Earth as a
planet in space habited by mankind. Renee realises that the ground is the surface of the
Earth and the sky envelopes the Earth in the same way as the atmosphere.
6.2.4 Supporting Evidence: Variations of the Root Concept of Circularity in Drawing
and Modelling Earth Shape and Motion Concepts
Support for the argument (RQ1b) thatmemorymay be non-representational and that concepts
may be considered as generalities or universals comes from evidence from interviews of a
core concept of circularity underlying children’s concepts of shape and motion. In keeping
with Edelman’s (2005) re-entry theory, this core concept informs 2D and 3D shape and
motion concepts. We argue that shape concepts such as spheres, discs and cylinders are
derivatives of the concept of a circle. Similarly, motion concepts such as rotation and rev-
olution are derivatives of a circular twist and a circular path (orbit). There is also interplay
(imagery) between 2D and 3D concepts of circularity best replicated by play-dough mod-
ellingwhere there are three axes of shape andmotion available to themind/hands (see Fig. 1).
6.3 Memory as a Dynamic Process with Concepts Reflecting Deep Links
between Perceptual Motor Skills and Higher-Level Cognition
Is there any data to support the view that memory consists not in the storage and retrieval
of symbols, but results from a dynamical process of activation whereby concepts reflect
deep links between perceptual motor skills and higher-level cognition (c.f. Clancey 1999)?
(RQ2a). Confirming indicators: Child demonstrates coordination between perceptual
motor skills such as hand motion skill (utilised when modelling the shape of ESM), and
higher-level cognition such as being able to describe and draw the shape of ESM. Con-
ceptual stability and change is coordinated through re-entrant signalling between higher-
level cognition in the mind and different motor modalities representing concepts through
speech, drawing and modelling. Disconfirming indicators: No evidence of the child
changing his/her mind when describing, drawing or modelling ESM shape concepts.
Responses remain fixed. The illustrations here show how children can change their minds,
often suddenly, in the course of their explanations, which can be considered as reflecting
the dynamism emphasised in the Edelman/Barsalou conceptions of what is taking place in
the brain during recall (as opposed to the notion of simply retrieving a mental model).
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6.3.1 Casey (NZ: European: Female: Age 7 years 2 months: Junior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape of the Earth
R. Can you make the shape of the Earth with the green play-dough?
C. [Creates disc-shaped model of Earth by gripping play-dough to pick up and put down
model with right hand, pressing—on desk; with fingers; and between hands; moulding
between hands and gentle pressure with both hands].
R. Is that it?
C. [Crumples between hands then rolls in a circular motion on desk to create ball
shape].
R. Oh—you’ve not finished?
C. I need to make it round.
C. [Continues to shape into sphere by circular rolling on desk and between hands].
R. What shape have you made there?
C. A ball.
C. [Places model Earth on modelling sheet].
R. [Final Earth Shape Model is spherical: Earth Shape Category 1: see Table 1].
Casey unexpectedly crumpled her disc-shaped model Earth into an irregular lump and
formed a ball shape. This change indicated that Casey had two competing concepts of
Earth in mind; the flat Earth represented by the ground of everyday experience and the
spherical Earth of science. The process triggering the transformation is unknown, but it
was not the result of Socratic dialogue with the researcher: the child changing her mind
without dialogue other than ‘‘inner speech’’ (c.f. Vygotsky (2012).
Modelling the Shape of the Sun
R. (Can you) make the shape of the Sun with the red play-dough?
C. [Creates ball-shaped model by gripping to pick up and put down with right hand;
pressing between hands; moulding between hands].
C. [Breaks piece off of play-dough ball to make rays].
C. [Re-forms ball shape by moulding between hands and circular rolling on desk].
C. [Forms first ray by rolling between fingers and attaches to ball-shaped model].
C. [Prepares second ray then changes mind—removes first ray and crumples ball into
irregular lump incorporating rays and leftover play-dough from ray forming lump].
R. OK? (Interrogative).
C. [Flattens lump on desk and moulds to form disc].
R. Is that it?
C. Yes.
C. [Places model Sun on modelling sheet].
R. [Final Sun Shape Model is a disc: Sun Shape Concept Category 4: see Table 1].
Follow-up questions
R. What shape have you made the Sun?
C. It’s round.
R. Is that like a pancake, or like a ball?
C. A pancake.
Manipulating Models and Grasping the Ideas They Represent 73
123
Comparison between Shape Drawing and Shape Models
R. Is that shape of the Sun (I indicate model) the same as you made (drew) there (I
indicate drawing)?
C. [Considers]
R. This one (drawing) has spikes (rays) and that one (model) hasn’t, has it?
C. I can’t make spikes on it.
Casey initially made a ball-shaped model of the Sun by moulding the red play-dough
lump between her hands. For some reason, she then decided to break a lump off of her
already formed ball to provide material for the construction of rays (or ‘‘spikes’’ in chil-
dren’s vernacular—analogous to the spikes of a hedgehog or sea urchin—kina in Ma¯ori).
Casey then re-formed what remained of her original ball shape into a sphere and proceeded
to make rays to attach to the spherical model of the Sun. She attached the first ray
successfully but in the middle of attaching the second ray suddenly changed her mind. She
carefully removed the first ray, crumpled the spherical model, the rays, and the lump used
to form the rays into a single lump, which she moulded to form a ball. Then, again
unexpectedly, she appeared to change her mind for a second time and pressed the ball on
the desktop to form a disc. These changes indicate that Casey had at least three concepts of
the Sun in mind: one spherical without rays representing an approximation of the scientific
concept; the second, spherical with rays as portrayed in many children’s story books; and
third, the disc-shaped everyday Sun as experienced at sunset and sunrise. Casey’s expla-
nation for abandoning her spherical model with rays (replicating her drawing) was that she
couldn’t create and attach rays to her satisfaction. This led her to revert to earlier everyday
models of Sun Shape.
These rapid transformations—in the case of Earth Shape from disc to ball and in the
case of Sun Shape from ball, to ball with rays, to ball, to disc—suggest that Casey had
access to creative processes in memory (higher-level cognition, c.f. Clancey 1999) which
enabled her to compare verbal descriptions from dialogue with the researcher, with pre-
viously constructed drawings, to form models in play-dough interactively utilising multiple
modalities. This appeared to involve matching and evaluative processes (matching of
shape, and evaluation of kinesthetic and fine motor skills used in the modelling process). So
that, when the play-dough model did not meet the matching or evaluative criteria, it was
rejected in favour of a more achievable model.
6.3.2 Kane (NZ: Ma¯ori: Male: Age 8 years 11 months: Junior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape of the Earth, Sun and Moon with play-dough
Modelling the Shape of the Earth (1)
R. Could you make the shape of the Earth with the green play-dough?
C. Creates initial model of Earth by gripping play-dough lump; and pressing to pancake
shape on desktop and between hands].
R. It’s a kind of flat shape, is it?
C. [Refines shape to disc by pressing with fingers].
R. Like a pancake?
C. Sort of like a ball (gestures ball shape by cupping hands together).
R. It’s meant to be a ball, is it?
C. No—it’s like this (gestures concave curve with right hand indicating surface of large
ball).
R. [Initial Earth Shape Model is disc: Earth Shape Category 6: see Table 1].
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Modelling the Shape of the Sun
R. Can you make the shape of the Sun with the red play-dough?
C. [Models Sun as spherical by gripping; and circular rolling between hands and on
desk].
R. What shape is your Sun?
C. A circle—like a ball.
R. [Sun Shape Model is spherical: Sun Shape Concept Category 7: see Table 1].
Modelling the Shapes of the Moon
R. Can you make the shapes of the Moon with the yellow play-dough?
C. [Models crescent Moon by gripping; rolling between hands then curving into
crescent].
R. That’s the crescent one?
C. Yes.
C. [Models full Moon by circular rolling between hands and on desktop]
R. What shape is this one?
C. Like a ball.
R. So the Sun’s like a ball and the Moon’s like a ball?
C. Yes.
R. [Moon Model is ball with crescent: Moon Shape Category 9: see Table 1].
Modelling the Shape of the Earth (2)
R. What about the Earth?
C. [Considers].
R. You’ve made that like a pancake there, haven’t you (I indicate child’s model)?
C. [Considers].
R. Is it like a ball or like a pancake?
C. Like a ball.
R. Why have you made it like a pancake then?
C. Because I was going to roll it up.
R. Were you? OK (I hand model to child).
C. [Folds pancake to half disc then squashes to rough ball.
R. You were still shaping it (before)?
R. [I try to determine why child changed mind.]
C. Yes (refines shape to ball by circular rolling on desktop and moulding between
hands).
R. You weren’t meaning that sometimes it looks flat, were you?
C. Yes.
R. But it’s really like a ball?
C. Yes.
R. Earlier the child described and drew the Earth as a planet in space; with ground as
surface and sky around; and ‘‘Self’’ and ‘‘Friend’’ on opposite sides.
R. [Final Earth Shape Model is ball: Earth Shape Category 10: see Table 1].
In Kane’s case, transformation from a disc shape to a ball shape was initiated by
comparison between his disc-shaped model of the Earth and his ball-shaped models of the
Sun and Moon. Kane’s protocol demonstrates the role of gesture as a valuable but rela-
tively neglected modality. Here Kane used gesture to show the shape of the Earth in two
ways: firstly to show that the Earth is ball shaped by cupping his hands together as if
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enclosing a sphere, and secondly by moving his hand and arm in an arc to show that the
surface of the Earth is in the form of a gentle curve. Thus, the end shapes of models are
only part of the story: it is necessary to consider all model shapes created by the child
(utilising perceptual motor skills such as hand motion skill) together with any gestures of
shapes and triangulate these with verbal dialogue and drawings to form a more complete
picture of what may be going on in the child’s mind as they attempt to share their concepts.
6.3.3 Zhang Zhe (China: Han: Male: Age 8 years 11 months: Junior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape of the Earth with play-dough
R. Make the shape of the Earth with the green play-dough.
C. (Breaks play-dough lump into smaller pieces).
C. (Makes shape of Earth like a ball by rolling between hands then flattens it to a disc by
pressing with right hand on desk top).
R. Oh—are you flattening it now?
C. Yes.
R. I thought it was like a ball?
R. Is it not like a ball?
C. The Earth is round like a ball but I thought I should shape it like my drawing.
R. Make it the shape that it really is.
C. (Shapes Earth as a ball by rolling between hands).
R. What shape have you made there?
C. Round.
R. Like a ball?
C. Yes.
R. [Final Earth Shape Model is ball: Earth Shape Category 10: see Table 1].
Zhang Zhe unexpectedly (since he had described the Earth as ball shaped) pressed his
spherical Earth into a disc using his right, left and both hands in succession. When asked
why, he said he wanted his model to match his drawing that was circular in shape (see
protocol). Following Socratic dialogue, he transformed his disc-like Earth firstly into a
rough ball then into a smooth ball and repeated this process until he was satisfied that his
model shape represented a spherical Earth. This change from modelling the Earth as ball
shaped to disc shaped and then back to ball shaped illustrates the simultaneous interaction
between multiple modalities, presumably through multiple neural pathways connecting
cognition and motor control. The initial ball shape was created in response to a verbal
request (language modality) which triggered some aspect of the subject’s memory and
resulted in his brain and motor system making a sphere (kinesthetic modality). Then some
form of internal mapping compared the spherical model with the apparently flat circular
shape of his drawing (although his drawing was on the desk he did not glance at it while
modelling the Earth, so his reference to the drawing modality probably entailed imagery
rather that perception). This caused him to change his mind and transform the ball shape to
a disc shape by pressing between his hand and the desktop. This motion would have
resulted in kinesthetic feedback to his motor system to confirm that the model now mat-
ched the drawing (in terms of the criterion of 2D circularity). However, the researcher’s
surprise (communicated in the verbal language modality) caused Zhang Zhe to reassess his
model and to focus on the 3D rather than the 2D attributes (i.e. on sphericity rather than
circularity). This resulted in a second transformation of the play-dough medium from disc
shaped to ball shaped (by circular rolling between the hands), satisfying the new matching
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criteria between verbal description (round, like a ball), drawing (circular, like a ball) and
play-dough modelling–kinesthetic modalities (spherical).
Note that although Zhange Zhe changed his mind while modelling the shape of the
Earth, once he had settled on his final model he kept its shape constant while he modelled
the motion of the Earth, Sun and Moon. Thus, although there were variations in the
products of hand motion skill, from the perspective of motion concept skill there were no
variations in shape: a ‘‘counter example’’ or ‘‘disconfirming indicator’’ of the RQ.
The processes described have been included as an example of multi-modal modelling.
We agree that the psychological and physiological processes are probably commonplace in
everyday activities, but it served as an exemplar in support of a multi-modal methodology.
Switching between everyday flat Earth and scientific spherical Earth concepts and vice
versa is a dynamic process which probably occurs frequently. However, capturing this
process in action either spontaneously or as a result of Socratic dialogue is comparatively
rare.
6.3.4 Supporting Evidence: Correlation Graphs of Earth Shape versus Earth Motion
in Three Modalities
Support for the arguments (RQ1b and RQ2a) that rather than being representational,
memory is a dynamic process with concepts reflecting deep links between perceptual
motor skills and higher-level cognition comes from correlation studies plotting shape
against motion concepts. For example, plotting the Cosmological Concept Categories for
Earth Shape (in three modalities: interview, drawing, play-dough) against those of Earth
Motion (also in three modalities) with selected participants from New Zealand (n = 36)
and China (n = 36): hence, N = 72, revealed correlations of r = .77; r = .74 and r = .72,
respectively. See Fig. 2 and the relevant numerical data shown below.5
As we noted at the end of the section reviewing recent ideas in cognition, there may be
several factors underlying these relationships, such as how ideas about planetary shape and
motion figure during instruction or in presentations which children come across in books
and television, but one possibility relates to the now-demonstrated multi-modality of the
sensory-motor system. Modelling motion scientifically and modelling shape scientifically
may be pertinent reflections of that multi-modality. Our first consideration had been that
the coherence among the shape and motion concepts might indicate that there is a deeper
underlying structure (possibly founded on roundness, circularity and sphericity, as shown
in Fig. 1). But, regardless of whether or not this is the case, the coherence of these
5 Data from all 360 participants were reviewed and analysed in preparing this report, of which those from
the longitudinal survey group were considered to be most informative from a modelling perspective because
it was based on matched pairs and taken from the initial interviews. The scatter of ordinate values in the mid
range of the distribution was attributed to a region of transition as children’s concepts tended to become
more scientific.
Earth Shape Play-Dough v Earth Motion Play-Dough: Pearson r = .77; significant @ p\ .05.
Equivalent Spearman rs = .73; t (N-2) = 9.06; p-level = .0000; N = 72.
Earth Shape Interview v Earth Motion Interview: Pearson r = .74; significant @ p\ .05.
Equivalent Spearman rs = .69; t (N-2) = 7.90; p-level = .0000; N = 72.
Earth Shape Drawing v Earth Motion Drawing: Pearson r = .72; significant @ p\ .05.
Equivalent Spearman rs = .71; t (N-2) = 8.46; p-level = .0000; N = 72.
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Fig. 2 a Correlation graph of Earth Shape Interview versus Earth Motion Interview. b Correlation graph of
Earth Shape Drawing versus Earth Motion Drawing. c Correlation graph of Earth Shape Play-Dough versus
Earth Motion Play-Dough
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conceptions does support the notion that children’s ideas are both dynamic and multi-
modal.
These strong correlations between shape and motion concepts across modalities support
the arguments of RQ1b (that memory may be non-representational and that concepts may
be considered as generalities or universals) and RQ2b (that memory is a dynamic process
with concepts reflecting deep links between perceptual motor skills and higher-level
cognition). The correlations suggest that there is an underlying core concept of com-
monality between shape and motion of the ESM, such as the concept of circularity dis-
cussed above (shape concepts such as spheres and discs are derivatives of the concept of a
circle; motion concepts such as rotation and revolution are derivatives of a circular twist
and a circular orbit). The evidence suggests that if a child cannot describe, draw or model
the Earth as a sphere (as a circle in 2D, or a ball in 3D), it is unlikely that they can visualise
the Earth rotating (spinning) on its axis or revolving in a circular (or elliptical) orbit around
the Sun. Whereas a child who knows that the Earth is spherical and can describe, draw and
model a spherical shape, is better able to utilise dynamic imagery and higher-level cog-
nition to imagine the Earth spinning and orbiting the Sun, and to model these processes
using perceptual motor skills.
6.4 Concepts as Simulators or Skills in Creating Images Consistently Over
a Range of Modal Stimuli and Responses
Is there any evidence in support of the contention that concepts are skills or simulators for
constructing idiosyncratic representations (Barsalou 2003)? (RQ2b). Confirming indica-
tors: Child refers to all three modalities during interview with similar responses from each
modality (reinforced by repetition of performance; i.e. forming the same concept repeat-
edly within and across media). Thus, illustrating coherence of images of ESM Shape and/
or Motion mediated by skill in image creation, and cognitive ability in static and dynamic
mental simulation. Disconfirming indicators: Child refers to the immediate modality only
and responses echo previously configured shapes and presentations without interconnect-
ing thoughts. These examples illustrate the importance of children striving for consistency
among their thoughts, whether—for at least the duration of the interview—these thoughts
result in improved scientific thinking, or the maintenance of alternative frameworks.
6.4.1 Linda (NZ: European: Female: Age 7 years 2 months: Junior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape of the Earth
R. Can you make the shape of the Earth with the green play-dough?
C. [Rolls ball then squeezes on desk with heels of hands to form flat rectangular shape].
R. Alright (interrogative)?
C. [Folds pancake inwards to form lump then rolls into ball again].
R. [I adjust modelling sheet to give child more room for modelling].
C. [Rolls ball on desk to form sphere]
R. That was a square shape you were making, was it?
R. [Earlier in interview child described the Earth as square and drew it as a rectangle.]
C. Yes—I’m trying to make it.
C. [Flattens ball to disc by squeezing and kneading with heel and palm of hand].
C. [Traced a square on disc shaped pancake as if cutting].
R. Are you wanting to cut it?
C. Yes.
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R. Well you can use this (I hand child plastic ruler).
C. [Cuts small irregular quadrilateral from pancake using ruler edge].
R. Where is the Earth?
C. That bit (indicates small irregular quadrilateral).
C. [Crumples remainder of pancake into ball].
R. That’s not square (I indicate small irregular quadrilateral)!
C. No—I’m making another.
C. [Flattens ball into oblong pancake].
R. You’re wanting to make a square, are you?
C. Yes (commences to cut oblong pancake again—somewhat hesitant – deep in thought).
R. Do you know how to cut a square?
C. Yes (cuts a more regular rectangular piece).
R. Is that a square?
C. Yes.
C. [Places model Earth on modelling sheet].
R. [Final Earth Shape Model rectangular: Earth Shape Category 4: see Table 1].
Comparison between model and drawing
R. Is that Earth (I indicate child’s model) like that one (I indicate child’s drawing)?
C. (Considers).
R. Is that (model) the same as that (drawing)?
C. No (attempts to re-orientate model which is placed horizontally so that it matches her
drawing which shows a vertical rectangle).
R. No – don’t move it – it’s alright!
C. [Retracts hand from model].
R. Is that (drawing) like that (model)?
C. Yes.
Modelling Ground and Sky
R. If that’s the Earth (I indicate child’s model); where is the ground?
R. [I seek to ascertain whether the child holds the Earth and ground to be synonymous].
C. I’ll make the ground.
R. No – just tell me.
C. [Considers].
R. Is the ground there or not?
C. No.
R. Where is the sky?
C. Up there (indicates area above models of Earth, Sun and Moon, as in her drawing).
R. [Sky is drawn as curve above Earth, Sun and Moon].
R. Where would the ground be?
C. [Indicates area below model Earth].
R. Down there?
C. Yes.
R. [Linda drew the ground as square, below and separate from the Earth].
Initially, Linda made a rough ball shape which she flattened into a rough disc then
further pressed into a thin pancake-like layer. She then folded the play-dough pancake and
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moulded it into a rough ball. This she shaped into a smooth ball that she pressed into a
smooth disc and then a flat pancake from which she created an irregular shape similar to a
quadrilateral using a ruler as a cutting tool. Dissatisfied with her initial shape, she re-
modelled the play-dough into a rough ball and repeated the process of flattening into a disc
(pancake) from which she formed a second rectangular shape. Thus, the ball-shaped Earth
afforded transformation into a disc shape by pressing, and the disc shape could be cut to
produce a rectangular shape representing the everyday Earth. However, when asked to
indicate the ground, Linda offered to make it, thus indicating that her model of the Earth
did not incorporate the ground and was not synonymous with the ground. Interestingly,
when comparing verbal descriptions with models and drawings, Linda attempted to re-
orientate her rectangular model of the Earth (with its major axis horizontal) to the same
orientation as her drawing of the Earth (with its major axis vertical), suggesting that an
unconscious matching process was taking place during modelling with the model being
shaped to match the image of the drawing, and a conscious matching process taking place
during later comparison guided by the researcher’s questions. These comparisons between
multiple modalities indicate dynamic conceptual simulations of coherent images of Earth,
Sun and Moon Shape consistent with Barsalou’s (2003) theory of concepts as simulators or
skills.
The question arises as to whether Linda’s intermediary ball-shaped and disc-shaped
models represented the Earth or whether they were simply stages in the manipulation of the
play-dough leading to a flat pancake from which a rectangular shape representing the Earth
could be cut—much as a baker manipulates dough where the shape of the intermediate
stages have no obvious relationship to the shape of the finished product. Based on
observation of the modelling process alone, the question is difficult to answer. Fortunately,
we have other media (verbal dialogue and drawing) to call upon, together with the
knowledge of what the child has been taught in school to triangulate what the child may
have had in mind. These indicate that Linda did indeed know of the scientific spherical
Earth (she modelled the Sun and Moon as spherical) and she may well have considered this
option but chose finally to model an earlier everyday concept of a flat Earth in the form of a
square in preference to the spherical one.
6.4.2 Takarangi (NZ: Ma¯ori: Male: Age 8 years 7 months: Junior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape of the Sun
R. (Can you) make the shape of the Sun with the red play-dough?
C. [Creates ball-shaped model of the Sun by pressing and moulding between hands].
R. What shape have you made there?
C. A little one like a pancake (unclear).
R. It’s like a ball as well (as the Earth)?
R. [Child modelled Earth as ball-shaped].
C. It’s probably like a pancake.
R. Like a pancake?
C. Yes.
R. If it’s like a pancake, shouldn’t it be flat (I gesture flatness with a pressing
movement)?
C. Yes (flattens play-dough ball on desk top with right hand).
R. You think it’s like a pancake?
C. Yes (continues to flatten ball to disc by pressing between hands).
R. You don’t think it’s like a ball?
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C. [No verbal response—continues to flatten shape to disc on knee].
R. Put it on here to flatten it (I indicate desk top).
C. OK (continues to flatten to disc on desk top by pressing with both hands).
R. [Final Sun Shape Model is a disc: Sun Shape Concept Category 4: see Table 1].
Takarangi initially modelled the Sun as a sphere but changed his mind when asked what
shape he had made. He described his model as pancake-shaped, which conflicted with the
physical model he had created which was ball-shaped. The interviewer’s argument that a
pancake is flat was immediately accepted by the child who then re-modelled his Sun as a
flat disc. Although scientifically incorrect, the child was satisfied that his model of the Sun
no longer conflicted with his mental image of the Sun which was consistent with his
descriptions and drawings. The fact that his model Sun is disc-shaped, whereas his model
Earth and model Moon are ball shaped does not strike the child as inconsistent at this stage
of development. Takarangi tended to be preoccupied with creating his disc-shaped Sun in
the modelling modality. Although prompted by Socratic dialogue to reconsider [R. You
don’t think it’s like a ball?], he persevered with making his model Sun as he imagined it to
be. His focus on the immediate kinesthetic modality is a ‘‘counter example’’ to the RQ.
These protocols illustrate that children can hold both ‘‘confirming’’ and ‘‘disconfirming
indicators’’ of the RQs during the same interview depending on the degree of interaction
with the researcher through questions in the Interview Guide or through Socratic dialogue.
As can be seen from the examples, the proportion of ‘‘confirming indicators’’ is much
higher than that of ‘‘disconfirming indicators’’ adding further support to affirmative con-
firmation of the research questions.
6.4.3 Shi Lin (China: Han: Female: Age 9 years 2 months: Senior Primary School)
Modelling the Shape, Nature and Structure of the Moon with Play-dough
R. Make the shapes of the Moon with the yellow play-dough.
R. You made (drew) several Moon Shapes—four of them—so you can make all of
those.
R. [I hand child four lumps of yellow play-dough].
R. [I introduce child’s drawing of the Earth, Sun and Moon].
R. These are the Moon Shapes that you drew there (I indicate child’s drawing).
C. (Makes first Moon Shape – a ball – by circular rolling between hands; then curves
ball into cusp; then into disc by pressing between hands; then pressing on desk; then
begins to tear apart but changes mind and squeezes back to ball; then refines ball shape
by circular and horizontal rolling between hands and between hands and desk).
C. (Makes second Moon Shape – a crescent – by circular rolling between hands; then
flattening ball to a disc by pressing on desk with right and left hand alternatively; then
splitting disc into two semi-discs; and shaping one of the semi-discs into a crescent
shape by gripping with right hand and tapping edge on palm of left hand as on an anvil;
then tapping on desk; and moulding/forming with fingers).
R. You’re making a good job of these.
C. (Makes third Moon Shape – a disc – by rolling into ball by circular rolling between
hands; then pressing on desk with right hand to form disc).
R. It’s a little thin one, the last one, isn’t it?
C. (Makes fourth Moon Shape by switching back to discarded semi-disc from second
Moon Shape, and shaping it into a crescent by pressing on desk with right hand, both
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hands, and left hand respectively; then trimming off the edges with her fingers using a
tearing motion; and finally shaping and moulding edges with fingers).
C. (Returns to third Moon Shape – a disc –; flattens again by pressing on desk with both
hands; then tears apart; rolls half between hands to form a ball; flattens ball to disc by
pressing on desk; tears disc apart to form two semi-discs; and trims off edge by plucking
off surplus play-dough).
R. [I comment that it is like making jia˘ozi—dumplings].
C. I know how to make dumplings.
R. What shape is that Moon there (I indicate ball-shaped model Moon)?
C. Round like a ball.
R. Are all of these ones flat (I indicate the three crescent Moon Shapes)?
C. No—round like a pancake.
R. Are these ones like parts of a pancake?
C. Yes.
R. [Model is spherical with phases: Moon Shape Category 10: see Table 1].
Shi Lin’s modelling of Moon shapes demonstrates that, like most Chinese children of
her age, she held coexisting cultural and scientific concepts of the Moon. This duality is
manifest in Shi Lin’s modelling the scientific Moon Shape as a ball and the crescent-
shaped phases of the Moon as semi-discs. The latter are visualised as sections of a pancake
(bing) rather than sections of a ball or sphere or simply flat. Shi Lin’s change of mind when
creating her first Moon model—where she begins to tear her disc shape apart to create two
semi-discs and then decides to revert to her original ball shape, may also reflect the tension
between representing both the cultural and the scientific view. But it also shows that she
had a clear idea of all of the shapes that she intended to make before she started modelling.
This may have been influenced by cross-reference to her drawing but, in terms of showing
the 3D aspects of the two main shapes, this seems unlikely. Throughout her modelling, Shi
Lin appeared to have some form of mental reference to which she was referring shape by
shape and hand motion by hand motion. Rather than some form of mental models or
symbols in memory, it seemed more likely that she was creating comparisons from
information in her mind by means of simulations (c.f. Barsalou 2003; Edelman 2005).
6.5 Age, Gender, Culture and Ethnicity as Factors in Concept Creation
The principal study of this research has focused on the qualitative analysis of the interview
protocols. However, at the end of the section containing the research questions, we
explained the need for a secondary, quantitative analysis checking for possible gender and
culture/ethnicity effects on subjects’ scores on the classification categories established for
Earth Shape and motion (the categories shown in Tables 1, 2). As indicated earlier in
relation to that analysis, we had hypothesised that:
H1 the dynamic structure of memory and concept creation will be similar in both
genders and common across cultures [NZ boys v. NZ girls; China boys v. China girls; NZ
v. China; NZ European v. NZ Ma¯ori];
H2 repeated interviews in this longitudinal study will lead to enhanced modelling skills
and/or more advanced shape and motion concepts.
The results supported the hypotheses as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
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7 Conclusions
7.1 Support of Research Questions and Hypotheses
The evidence here suggests that concept creation is a multifaceted dynamic process
involving conceptual and motor skills and simulations as proposed by Barsalou (2003) and
that these processes are compatible with Edelman’s re-entry theory involving multiple
Table 3 Results of Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test [K–S]: Modelling concept category
Modelling concept Culture Gender N M p value
(a) Testing Hypothesis H1: Gender: 2nd Survey: Boys versus Girls
Earth Shape NZ Boys 34 8.82 p[ .10
Girls 36 7.75
China Boys 32 8.75 p[ .10
Girls 28 8.96
Earth Motion NZ Boys 34 6.41 p[ .10
Girls 36 6.39
China Boys 32 6.53 p[ .10
Girls 28 7.18
Modelling concept Culture N M p value
(b) Testing Hypothesis H1: Cross-Cultural: 1st NZ Survey versus 1st China Survey [K–S]
Earth Shape NZ 36 8.69 p[ .10
China 36 8.50
Earth Motion NZ 36 6.00 p[ .10
China 36 5.28
Modelling concept Ethnicity N M p value
(c) Testing hypothesis H1: Ethnicity: 2nd NZ Survey: NZ European versus NZ Ma¯ori [K–S]
Earth Shape NZ European 22 8.41 p[ .10
NZ Ma¯ori 22 8.09
Earth Motion NZ European 22 5.18 p[ .10
NZ Ma¯ori 22 4.77
There were no significant differences, but the means of NZ boys were greater than the means of NZ girls in
both cases, whereas the means of China girls were greater than the means of China boys in both cases. A
similar pattern was evident for the Sun and Moon. These results support H1 that the dynamic structure of
memory and concept creation will be similar in both genders
Similar results were obtained from comparison of the 2nd Survey groups
The means of the NZ Survey group were higher than the China Survey group in all cases, but there were no
significant differences. These findings support hypothesis H1 that the dynamic structure of memory and
concept creation will be common across cultures
The NZ Ma¯ori participants were matched with a selection of the NZ European sample based on age, gender,
general ability and socio-economic status (parent’s occupations). There were no significant differences, but
the means of NZ Europeans tended to be slightly greater than the means of NZ Ma¯ori. Results for the Sun
and Moon were similar. The results are evidence in support of hypothesis H1 that the dynamic structure of
memory and concept creation will be common across ethnicities (or ethnic groups)
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neural pathways and non-representative memory. Each child is unique and so is each
child’s cosmology. Although we can generalise, classify and categorise cosmological
concepts to reveal overall patterns, at an individual level such schemes only approximate
the end products of what a child believes; they say little about the process of concept
creation. And because they are concerned with recording and reporting what they find as
end products in a representational format, they tend to take for granted a representational
view of memory.
However, from the perspective of the neural, psychological and physiological processes
involved, a representational mode of presentation (and an underlying representational
understanding of memory) appears to be inadequate and mismatched to the richness of the
data available. It also fails to recognise the rapidity of conceptual change at an individual
level, in terms of the multi-modal options being considered simultaneously. Through this
study, we may not have sufficient evidence to completely reject mental models and rep-
resentational memory, but we have shown that there is a more dynamic and flexible
interpretation possible, one which recognises concepts as skills and simulations within an
underlying theory of neural re-entry networks and non-representative memory. Having
found that the RQs are supported in our samples suggests that they are likely to occur in the
population in general.
The categorisation scheme which we used in this and previous research, and the
methodology on which it is founded, has had the advantage over others6 in being multi-
modal and open-ended in nature: with inputs from interview, drawing and modelling
triangulated to determine a category (of that cosmological element at that time). The
scheme is more dynamic than those that rely on verbal language alone, or language with
some drawing, or those based on forced-choice responses with limited opportunity for in-
Table 4 Testing Hypothesis H2: Results of Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test [K–S]: Modelling
concept category
Modelling concept Culture Group N M p value
Earth Shape NZ Survey 36 8.58 p[ .10
Control 34 7.94
China Survey 30 8.90 p[ .10
Control 30 8.77
Earth Motion NZ Survey 36 6.58 p[ .10
Control 34 6.21
China Survey 30 6.97 p[ .10
Control 30 6.70
Longitudinal: Survey group versus Control group
There were no significant differences between the Survey and Control groups in either culture [K–S:
p[ .10: a .05]. However, the means of the NZ & China Survey groups were higher than the means of the
Control groups in all cases. This suggests that repeated interviews in longitudinal studies of dexterity can
result in Survey groups having more enhanced modelling skills and/or more advanced shape and motion
concepts as a result of modelling experience. However, the impact of the repeated measures was not
significant (as desired in longitudinal studies)
6 For example, see Nussbaum & Novak (1976), Nussbaum (1979), Sneider and Pulos (1983), Vosniadou
and Brewer (1992), all of which utilised verbal interviews with some opportunities for children’s drawings
but no play-dough (or equivalent) modelling by children themselves.
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depth probing of ideas through Socratic dialogue. The underlying procedure also limits the
use of cultural artefacts likely to influence children’s responses7 by avoiding pre-made
models and globes.8 However, the difficulty for all researchers who utilise categorisation
schemes is that children do not put into words everything that they think; nor do they draw
every image that they imagine; nor do they create every shape that comes to mind when
modelling. Researchers capture only a fraction of the concept creation process, and have to
infer from that evidence the processes that are composing the action that they hear and see.
With the caveat expressed earlier in this article regarding the facilitating (and con-
straining) circumstances regarding semi-structured interviewing, the findings support all
four research questions and both tentative hypotheses. The hand dexterity results (i.e. types
of grips and hand motions used by children to shape and manipulate play-dough) are
similar to those reported by others in the field (see Elliott and Connolly 1984; Napier
1956). Similarly, the Earth, Sun and Moon Shape and Motion results (i.e. Cosmological
Concept Categories and Earth notions) are compatible with those that we and others have
reported in the past (Bryce and Blown 2006, 2007, 2012, 2013; Blown and Bryce 2006,
2010, 2012; Nussbaum 1979; Nussbaum and Novak 1976; Sneider and Pulos 1983).
However, the overall findings differ from those of other researchers in the field whose
analyses have incorporated the term mental models with implications of representational
memory (see Vosniadou and Brewer 1992, 1994). Our own results here support the
alternative position that concepts are generated by cognitive and motor skills and
simulations.
Methodologically, our results underline the necessity of probing beneath the surface
appearances by Socratic dialogue in association with drawings and models, to reveal what
children really think. Interviewing a child multi-modally is analogous to looking at a
galaxy with different wavelengths of light. A galaxy may look quite uninteresting in visible
light but spectacular in ultraviolet or infrared or sub-millimetre radiations. The research
strategy we have adopted also points to an additional interpretation of Barsalou’s view of
concepts as skills: in an interview situation, the skill of the child is being honed by the skill
of the interviewer. The experienced ethnographic researcher who is accepted, relaxed and
not pressured by time will be able to obtain a much more accurate picture of a child’s
concept than will a stranger who is not used to children or familiar with the school
community or wider culture, under time pressure, and using a methodology restricted to
verbal language without Socratic dialogue.
7.2 Levels of Analysis
The study was limited to what can be known from analysis of children’s verbal responses
to Piagetian/Vygotskian interview questions utilising Socratic dialogue, children’s draw-
ings, and children’s play-dough modelling sequences recorded with audio and video tape.
The researchers did not have access to sophisticated hand motion analysis techniques
involving computer modelling, capturing hand motion in image sequences (see Chien et al.
2010; Lin et al. 2002). However, we recognise that a more complete study allowing for
greater qualitative and quantitative analysis could benefit from the application of such
techniques. For example, we hypothesise that concept skill in the way that Barsalou uses
7 For example, see Fre`de et al. (2011), Nobes et al. (2003) and Panagiotaki et al. (2006), who found that
changing the interview structure from open ended (based on Vosniadou and Brewer 1992) to forced choice,
dramatically limited the range children’s of Earth Shape categories.
8 See Schoultz et al. (2001), Vosniadou et al. (2005).
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the term involves an integration of cognitive skill and motor skill: the two being mutually
intertwined and supportive (see Donaldson 1978) through neural re-entry and feedback
circuits so that they develop in close unity (Edelman 2005).
But measurement of dexterous skill is limited by the ability of the human eye and brain
to detect fine motor movement (as the researcher found when ‘‘freezing’’ individual
motions at 1/25 s on video). As mentioned above, it was observed that some older children
use apparently fewer gross hand motions than younger children to achieve the same result
(e.g. to create a spherical-shaped model Earth) which confounded measurements based on
recording gross motor motions alone. The reason being related to repeated handgrip
motions (whereas a young child may take several different (gross) hand motions to create a
spherical shape, an older child can complete the task in apparently fewer (gross) motions
by utilising greater muscular strength and enhanced fine motor skills to mould the play-
dough by ‘‘pumping’’ with their hands). Such movements are difficult to detect without
sophisticated apparatus. We believe that if these difficulties could be overcome the
research questions might qualify some of the explanations, we have tendered. We can also
see possible applications of brain imaging techniques such as MRI to record areas of
activity as children model the shape and motion of the planetary objects, but such a
programme on a large scale would be an expensive undertaking.
7.3 The Coherence of Children’s Conceptual Models
In an earlier section, we discussed the coherence we have detected in children’s concep-
tualisations in this field of developmental research, noting the correspondences between
our own findings and those of Vosniadou et al. and the contrasts with those of diSessa’s
knowledge-in-pieces theory. The recent paper by Vosniadou and Skopeliti (2014) recon-
siders the issues and makes a case for children’s naı¨ve physics (the understandings that
children develop on the basis of their everyday experiences, observations and lay culture)
being relatively coherent and not fragmented; that these understandings constitute a
framework. Only with children’s subsequent attempts to incorporate more formal (school)
learning and often counter-intuitive concepts, does learning acquire fragmentation, the
extent of it dependent, among other things, on how patient and sensitive is their school
instruction: careful teachers can help children deal with cognitive conflict and prevent
fragmentation taking place. The authors state that their framework theory accepts that
children can hold internally inconsistent ideas: the ‘‘framework’’ imposes some general
constraints upon their explanations but permits contextual variations and therefore con-
flicting details to exist and be apparent to teachers/researchers.
Vosniadou and Skopeliti’s (2014) discussion is in line with our previous findings about
conceptual coherence, and it is pertinent therefore to ask whether the findings we have
provided in this paper shed any particular light on the coherence debate. We would argue
that they do, that Edelman’s stress upon the creative steps involved in the reproductive act
of remembering can be developed further to understand what might be taking place during
an interview. The data seems to suggest a creative or imaginative process in which
composite coherent images are created from elements from a selection of alternative
images with corresponding linguistic and modelling equivalents (analogous to concepts as
skills and simulations). But these seem to be infinitely variable and contrary to mental
models. For example, we found examples of images being rotated and reversed over time,
such as images of the crescent Moon reversed by top-to-bottom rotation perpendicular to
the page rather than by clockwise or anti-clockwise rotation between motion drawings and
models a year apart, and switches in orientation of crescent Moons from facing right to
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facing left in consecutive drawings and models. These multi-modal variations in per-
spective are hard to explain by mental model theory but fit well with the idea that they are
being created from a dynamic set of elements. Further evidence in support of Edelman’s
interpretation comes from instances where children transform spherical models to disc-
shaped models and vice versa in a matter of seconds as they oscillate between 2D and 3D
images (everyday versus scientific concepts) in their imagination.
7.4 Concept Creation and Remembering
Speculating further, when we try to recall what we know about something (that crops up in
our observations/conversations/reactions to teacher or researcher questions, etc.…) is the
act of remembering a process where anything relevant—whether words, visual images,
favourite sounds, artefacts of some sort—are brought to mind (not necessarily all instantly)
and, at that point, an inventive process then takes place where a mental response is devised:
hence the dynamism. Does the expression substrate hint at what we are working from
creatively, but not deliberately or thoughtfully so at first? Does the created product then
consciously constitute what we are remembering? Is Edelman correct to emphasise the
creativeness but overdoing the condemnation of any and all mental representations? In his
2005 text, Edelman pressed the distinction between what is triggered in our minds when
questioned being non-representational and the subsequent perceptual mappings being
representational (thus affording conscious understanding, meaning or semantic content).
‘‘The essential issue to grasp is that the re-entrant circuitry underlying consciousness is
enormously degenerate. There is no single circuit activity or code that corresponds to a
given conscious ‘representation’’’ (Edelman 2005, pp. 105–106).
Perhaps the expression used above—elements—points to what might be appropriate. If
the creativeness involved in the recall process is correct, there should be
1. some similarities each time we are so questioned and respond (hence the coherence
detectable),
2. increasing similarities each time we are questioned like this and respond accordingly,
3. some variations because what is available is changing with intervening learning and
development, and
4. the creative act at any point might itself throw up different ideas depending on what is
triggered first or what mindset is operating, ideas which, upon their articulation, could
reconfigure what we are thinking of.
Also, as per the Dresp-Langley (2012) conclusions alluded to earlier, some unconscious
thoughts of use may be triggered and alter the formulation we give to our response. The
findings of our research fit well with this theorising, a particular case in point being the
examples of images being rotated and reversed over time. These run contrary to repro-
duction and fit with creation (construction); something relevant is being used in the pro-
cess, but something different and still relevant (or bettered) is produced (= remembered).
As we interact with the world multi-modally, switching will be commonplace—though
illustrations by their very nature are difficult though not impossible to capture, as this
research has shown.
Points 1–4 above suggest that some Socratic questions may be better than others in
influencing what a subject may bring to mind, thereby altering his/her creations. And of
course being made to shift modes will make for differences. Future investigations might
fruitfully consider the details which follow from particular Socratic questions. But, given
that every interviewee is unique, the flow of questions and answers, and any alternatives,
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would be very difficult to track. At least future research should look at things in more detail
than has been done in the past in order to try to separate the reproductive part from the
creative parts of the remembering process. If there are elements, as described above, when
does any repeated production constitute a mental model or, to use the traditional term,
concept?
We opened this article with a quotation from literature, citing Mark Twain (1989,
p. 421) as having said (no doubt with a touch of irony) that ‘‘You cannot depend on your
eyes when your imagination is out of focus’’. This may be an apposite comment here, given
its emphasis on the relationship between what we are thinking about or anticipating, what
is in our ‘‘mind’s eye’’ and what we look for and see. Perhaps we should recognise that at
the heart of what we think of when trying to recollect something is a creative, or imagi-
native step in the process of memory which shapes what we choose to say (and see
figuratively and possibly devise). Edelman’s message would be that there is little or
nothing programmed at this point; the brain’s perceptual mappings permit a range of
alternatives to be created and spelled out.
Other developments in cognitive scientific research corroborate this idea that mental
models are constructed in a dynamic way at the point of recall and that imagery plays ‘‘a
very large, even pivotal, role in memory’’ (Thomas 2014, p. 1). To cite a few of these
developments:
• Gibbs (2005) argues that (image) schemas are not enduring mental representations but
are temporary links between sensory experience and short-term, transitory conceptu-
alizations of both concrete events and abstract ideas.
• Gauker (2011) considers that much of our thinking takes place via mental imagery
without the help of concepts, though true conceptual thinking and the meaningfulness
of ideas derives from language and how we communicate with each other—to which
we would add—through multi-modal interactions: language (spoken, written, gesture),
drawing and modelling.
• Monti and Osherson (2012) report that, almost counter-intuitively, the role of language
in reasoning is confined to an initial stage where verbally presented information is
encoded as non-verbal representations. These are subsequently manipulated by mental
operations that are not based on the neural mechanisms which handle natural language.
Also our sensory-motor systems seem to play a rather different role in our thinking than
has been hitherto thought:
• Gallese and Lakoff (2005) replace the original notion that knowledge consists of
amodal, symbolic representations with the radical view that concepts are embodied, i.e.
mapped within the sensory-motor system: it provides both the structure and the
semantic content of knowledge. Consistent with Edelman’s (2005) analysis of neural
networks and how they work, this means that the sensory-motor system is multi-modal
and not modular. And, as Gallese and Lakoff emphasise, language itself is inherently
multimodal. Imagining grasping makes use of the same neural substrate as actually
performing and perceiving grasping. Thus, imagining is a form of simulation—a mental
simulation of an action or a perception, using much of the same neuronal circuitry as
actually acting or perceiving.
This too squares with Barsalou’s (2008) contentions.
And recent neurobiological, animal experimentation offers further corroborations:
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• The conventional view of memory consolidation has been that the hippocampus is
responsible for the rapid encoding of ideas or events (working memory) and that the
neocortex is involved in slow learning and the subsequent establishment of long-term
memories. Tse’s (2011) research shows that consolidation can occur rapidly if an
appropriate schema exists into which new information can be integrated. Generalising
from rats to humans, we can say that rapid memory formation is therefore dependent on
previously learned schemas; when present, relevant schemas enable subjects to acquire
new ideas quickly and effectively.
• Intriguingly, the finding of ‘‘mirror neurons’’ in monkeys by Rizzolatti and Craighero
(1998)—whereby the same neuron is active when the animal either engages in an
action, or observes another animal engaging in that same action—leads Nadel and
Piattellli-Palmarini (2003) to write: ‘‘The existence of such neurons raises questions of
great import to philosophers of mind… The possible role of a system of mirror neurons
in the creation of internal mental models is obvious’’ (p. 32).
Clearly, the research described in this article has concentrated, in terms of data, upon
children’s ideas about observational astronomy and it will be for future researchers to
explore other areas of knowledge, seek corroboration and further clarifications to how we
should understand the processes concerned. The problem of how people reason is
important because the nature of concepts and the structure of human memory are funda-
mental components of psychology. If concepts are indeed dynamic skills and simulations,
and if memory is indeed non-representational, then the implications for developmental
research will be quite revolutionary. With regard to teaching, it is clear that not every
individual learner will naturally activate cross-modality checks upon their thinking. This
suggests that in learning environments greater attention might be paid by teachers to
encourage such checks during the course of their practice.
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